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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
Is There a Higher-Order Mechanism that Explains Performance Across Prediction Tasks? 
by 
Michelle L. Eisenberg 
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychological and Brain Sciences 
Washington University in St. Louis 
Professor Jeffrey Zacks, Chair 
Professor Thomas Rodebaugh, Co-Chair 
 
People constantly make predictions about what will happen in the near future. People anticipate 
how other people around them will act, what other people will say, and what actions will help 
them achieve the greatest rewards. Because all of these behaviors are typically called prediction, 
it is easy to make the assumption that performance across all of these types of tasks is driven by 
the same underlying mechanism. However, there has been little investigation into whether the 
mechanisms underlying prediction are the same across multiple task modalities. Therefore, in the 
current study, 226 participants completed four types of tasks that putatively involve prediction to 
determine whether there is a common factor that can account for performance on these tasks. 
Fluid and crystallized intelligence were also assessed to ensure that general intelligence did not 
drive correlations among the tasks. Preliminary evidence from a recent study suggested that 
people with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) have difficulty with predicting future activity; 
therefore, participants also completed a questionnaire screening for symptoms of PTSD. 
Performance across the four prediction tasks was not correlated, and PTSD severity was not 
significantly correlated with any of the tasks in the study. These results suggest that there is not 
an integrative prediction mechanism in the brain, but rather that there are multiple prediction 
  viii 
systems operating in parallel within the brain. In addition, these results suggest that PTSD may 
only be associated with a subset, if any, of prediction tasks. Future researchers studying 
prediction must be careful to investigate performance on various prediction tasks separately, 
rather than assuming that prediction performance is stable across tasks.
  1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
The ability to anticipate what is going to happen in the near future is necessary for the 
survival of all animals. Prey animals must make predictions about the locations of their predators 
in order to avoid being eaten. Predators must anticipate the location of their prey so as not to 
starve. Humans, too, must constantly make predictions on timescales ranging from a fraction of a 
second to minutes, hours, and even days.  
But, are all forms of prediction the same? In other words, do the same mechanisms that 
allow people to anticipate the next word in a sentence also allow people to predict the next action 
of the person in front of them, or whether it is likely to rain later in the day? For the past few 
decades, researchers have studied the neural basis of prediction to investigate how people and 
animals anticipate future input (e.g., Hikosaka, Sakamoto, & Usui, 1989; Rao & Ballard, 1999; 
Tanaka et al., 2004; Dikker & Pylkkänen, 2013). However, there has been little work examining 
whether the mechanisms underlying prediction are the same across multiple task modalities (see 
Adams, Friston, and Bastos (2015) for some evidence of a ubiquitous prediction system). The 
current study therefore examined four types of tasks that putatively involve prediction to 
determine whether there is a common factor of prediction ability that accounts for performance 
on these tasks. If a common mechanism for prediction exists, clinical populations with deficits in 
one domain of prediction would be expected to display similar deficits across other prediction 
tasks. Previous research on Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) has found that people with 
higher levels of PTSD symptoms display difficulty with prediction of future human activity 
(Eisenberg, Zacks, Rodebaugh, & Flores, in prep). Therefore, this study also included a 
screening measure for symptoms of PTSD to determine whether this prediction deficit would 
generalize across all of the prediction tasks. 
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 There is evidence that many areas of the brain are involved in making predictions, and the 
predictive coding theory, an influential model of prediction mechanisms in the brain, suggests 
that prediction occurs in a hierarchical process that is similar across the brain (Friston, 2005). In 
this model, higher-order cortical areas use past experience to make predictions about future 
inputs and send these predictions to lower-order areas, which compare actual input from the 
environment to these predictions. When there is a mismatch between the actual input and the 
predictions, the lower-order areas send prediction error signals back to the higher-order areas 
(Friston, 2005). Much research provides evidence of hierarchical signaling from higher-order 
brain areas to lower-order brain areas and vice versa, including findings on prediction 
mechanisms in sensory areas (see Bendixen, SanMiguel, & Schröger, 2012, for a review), reward 
processing areas (e.g., Schultz, Tremblay, & Hollerman, 1998; Tanaka, et al., 2004), and 
language processing areas (Dikker & Pylkkänen, 2013; Fruchter, Linzen, Westerlund, & 
Marantz, 2015). Although Friston’s (2005) model does not require a single system for making 
predictions, Adams, Friston, and Bastos (2015) provide evidence that the neural circuitry for 
driving predictions is very similar across systems. They suggest that the individual systems 
should not be considered separate, but “instead as a single active inference machine that tries to 
predict its sensory input in all domains” (p. 100). 
 Other theories of information processing also posit the existence of a single integrative 
system that combines sensory information across modalities to generate predictions. For 
example, Event Segmentation Theory (EST; Zacks, Speer, Swallow, Braver, & Reynolds, 2007) 
suggests that people create representations of the current environment, called event models, 
based on incoming sensory information from various sensory modalities and semantic 
knowledge. Predictions about the near future are then formed on the basis of these event models, 
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and when errors in these predictions arise, the event model is reset to better represent the actual 
state of the world. Research using narrative texts (e.g., Zacks, Speer, & Reynolds, 2009), simple 
moving stimuli (e.g., Zacks, 2004), and complex activities (e.g., Zacks, Kurby, Eisenberg, & 
Haroutunian, 2011) has provided support for this model, suggesting that an event model may be 
one way of describing a higher-order integrative system that allows for predictions across 
modalities.  
 On the other hand, it is possible that rather than relying on an integrative prediction 
mechanism, each brain system uses a separate prediction mechanism that operates using only the 
information present in each brain system. For example, the visual system might have a prediction 
mechanism that operates using only visual information from the world and previous visual 
experience. As mentioned above, the predictive coding theory does not require an integrative 
prediction system, as Friston (2005) primarily argues that predictions operate in a hierarchical 
fashion within each brain system. Therefore, it is possible that multimodal stimuli (e.g., visual 
scenes that also involves music and speaking) activate multiple brain systems in concert, 
resulting in the illusion of integration without involving an integratory prediction mechanism. 
Because there is little research attempting to differentiate between an integratory prediction 
mechanism versus separate prediction mechanisms within each brain system, the current study 
represents an initial step toward determining whether such an integratory prediction mechanism 
actually exists. 
Previous research and theorizing on prediction, including research on the predictive coding 
theory and EST, are based, in part, in a large literature on the neural mechanisms involved in 
creating and maintaining predictions in the brain. As might be expected, an examination of this 
literature provides evidence both for and against a higher-order prediction mechanism that 
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integrates information across modalities. In particular, research on the neural mechanisms 
involved in creating and maintaining predictions in the sensory systems, reward processing 
systems, and language processing systems provides evidence both for and against such an 
integrative mechanism. In addition, error signaling from lower-order areas to higher-order areas 
is essential in models of a predictive brain, and research findings on error signaling also suggest 
evidence supporting and opposing a common prediction mechanism. Therefore, each of these 
topics is discussed in detail in this introduction, followed by a description of the tasks used in the 
current study. 
1.1 Prediction Formation 
According to the predictive coding model (e.g., Friston, 2005), prediction formation 
should occur within both lower-order and higher-order systems, with the higher-order systems 
capable of integrating information across modalities to form adaptive predictions about future 
input and then communicating these predictions to lower-order areas. Therefore, in this section, 
specific attention is given to evidence that higher-order areas are involved in the prediction 
process across modalities.  
1.1.1 Sensory Systems  
Within the sensory systems, the main focus of research has been on auditory and visual 
prediction mechanisms. One method of studying prediction formation in the auditory systems is 
to investigate the effects of repeating an auditory tone or a pattern of auditory tones a varying 
number of times, as predictions would be expected to increase in strength as the number of 
repetitions increases. Haenschel, Vernon, Dwivedi, Gruzelier, & Baldewag (2005), for example, 
investigated event related potentials (ERPs) while participants listened to series of tones that 
were presented 2, 6, or 36 times. They found a positivity that began 50 to 250 ms after a tone 
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was presented and that increased in strength as the number of repetitions increased, and they 
suggested that this repetition positivity is associated with the formation of a sensory memory 
representation of the repeated tone. Bendixen, SanMiguel, and Schröger (2012) took this finding 
a step farther and suggested that the sensory memory representation is used to predict future 
tones. They interpreted the repetition positivity as the signal that occurs when a predicted 
stimulus matches the actual stimulus.  
To further determine how the brain represents expectations of future stimuli, Raij, 
McEvoy, Mäkelä, and Hari (1997) investigated the brain response to omitted tones. They used 
magnetoencephalography (MEG) while participants listened to repeated tones. Seven percent of 
these tones were randomly omitted, and the authors found bilateral activation in the auditory 
cortex, particularly the supratemporal cortex, when the tones were omitted. They argued that this 
activation represents the buildup of an expectation of the tone and a signal indicating that this 
expectation was not fulfilled. Mustovic et al. (2003) conducted a similar study using functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). They had subjects listen to repeated patterns of sounds and 
interspersed a short period of deviant louder sound or a short period of silence into the pattern. 
Increased activity in the bilateral posterior secondary and association auditory cortices, right 
Heschl’s gyrus, and right planum temporale occurred during both types of deviant periods. In 
addition, greater activity during the silent period than the louder period was seen in the right 
planum temporale and part of the right temporoparietal junction, suggesting that these regions 
are involved in retrieving auditory memory traces for predicted (but absent) stimuli.  
Research on the visual system has found similar prediction mechanisms in the visual 
cortex. For example, Luft, Meeson, Welchman, & Kourtzi (2015) used fMRI and multi-voxel 
pattern analysis to examine predictions in primary visual cortex. They had participants view a 
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sequence of gratings with different orientations. After participants learned the sequence, they 
were able to detect patterns of activation in the primary visual cortex representing the 
participants’ predictions of the orientation of the next grating, providing evidence that the 
primary visual cortex maintains predictions about future visual stimuli. In another study using 
multi-voxel pattern analysis, participants viewed gratings with different orientations and heard 
auditory cues that provided information about the orientation of the next grating stimulus (Kok, 
Jehee, & Lange, 2012). The authors found that top down expectations driven by the auditory cue 
sharpened the representation of the predicted orientation in early visual cortex. Specifically, they 
found that expectation of a particular orientation dampened the overall response of the early 
visual cortex to the stimulus while simultaneously making it easier for the classifier to predict the 
behavioral response of the participant. These results suggest that higher-order cortical regions 
send top-down predictive signals to early visual cortex that bias the response in that area and 
facilitate performance on the task. 
Trapp and Bar (2015) posited a model of top-down and bottom-up predictive processing 
in the visual system, suggesting that the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) is involved in creating 
predictions that bias processing of visual stimuli based on context. Specifically, their model 
suggests that early visual areas send information at a low spatial frequency to the OFC, which 
uses that information and prior knowledge of the context to make predictions about the identity 
of the most likely input. These predictions bias the analyses performed by the visual areas toward 
the relevant options, which is consistent with predictive coding theory.  
1.1.2 Reward Processing Systems  
Predictions related to reward processing appear to be generated in the striatum, which 
includes the caudate and putamen (see Schultz, Tremblay, & Hollerman, 1998, for a review). For 
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example, populations of neurons in the caudate and putamen of behaving monkeys increase and 
maintain their firing rate during a delay before an expected target appears and during a delay 
before a reward is dispensed, suggesting that these neurons signal the expectation of a reward 
(Hikosaka, Sakamoto, & Usui, 1989; Apicella, Scarnati, Ljungberg, & Schultz, 1992).  
fMRI studies on reward prediction in humans have supported these animal findings. 
Tanaka, et al. (2004), for example, found that when participants learned a task involving 
immediate rewards, activity increased in the striatum, insula, and the lateral OFC, among other 
areas. In addition, when participants needed to maintain a representation of the reward structure 
in order to obtain future rewards, activity increased in the striatum, insula, ventrolateral PFC, the 
dorsolateral PFC, and other areas. In another fMRI study, activity in the striatum increased when 
participants saw cues that predicted rewards compared to when they saw cues that did not predict 
rewards (Ramnani, Elliott, Athwal, & Passingham, 2004). Providing further support for the 
involvement of the striatum in prediction, Ernst et al. (2004) found activation in the ventral 
striatum during the period right before participants received a reward. They also found activity in 
the left lateral and medial OFC and left insula (among other areas) during this period of reward 
anticipation. On the other hand, a meta-analysis of 142 studies of reward processing found that 
the bilateral insula, anterior cingulate cortex, inferior parietal lobule, and brain stem displayed 
activation related to anticipation of rewards, whereas the ventral striatum, medial OFC, and 
amygdala displayed increased activation during reward outcome stages (Liu, Hairston, Schrier, 
& Fan, 2011).  
Although the lower-order brain areas found to be involved in reward prediction tasks are 
different than those involved in visual and auditory prediction tasks, the tasks are similar in that 
higher-order brain areas are recruited during the performance of all of the tasks. These findings 
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again provide support for Friston’s predictive coding theory and suggest that higher-order areas 
may be necessary for integration of predictive information across modalities. 
1.1.3 Language Processing System  
The neural basis for prediction formation in the language processing systems has also 
received much attention. For example, Dikker & Pylkkänen (2013) used MEG while participants 
viewed pictures that were either strongly predictive or weakly predictive. After viewing each 
picture, participants saw a word that either matched or did not match the prediction generated by 
the picture and indicated whether the word was a match or a mismatch for the preceding picture. 
For example, in a predictive trial, participants might see a picture of an apple followed by the 
word “apple,” whereas in a weakly predictive trial, participants might see a picture of a grocery 
bag (which could represent any type of edible object) followed by the word “apple.” During the 
predictive trials compared to the weakly predictive trials, they found increased activity in the 
mid-temporal cortex and the ventromedial PFC around 350 ms before the onset of the noun and 
increased activity in the occipital lobe right before the noun was presented. The authors 
suggested that these results represent a predictive feedback process from higher- to lower-order 
cortical regions. Specifically, they posited that the activity in the visual cortex right before the 
noun was presented represented the preactivation of features associated with the predicted noun, 
that the activity in the mid-temporal cortex represented the preactivation of the predicted lexical 
representation of the noun, and that the activity in the ventromedial PFC represented the 
combination of lexical and semantic representations into a prediction of the future input. They 
further argued that the activation in the visual cortex corresponded to top-down activation of 
relevant features and the suppression of irrelevant features in response to the previously 
presented image.  
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Fruchter, Linzen, Westerlund, and Marantz (2015) found similar results when participants 
read adjective-noun phrases. They found increased activity in the left middle temproral gyrus 
during the time after the presentation of predictive compared to unpredictive adjectives but 
before the noun was presented. In addition, they found decreased activity in the left middle 
temporal gyrus when predictable nouns were presented, suggesting that activity in this area 
decreased once predictions were fulfilled. The results of these studies again suggest a 
hierarchical prediction system in which higher-order areas form predictions and then 
communicate these predictions to other areas of the brain. 
1.2 Human Electroencephalographic Studies of Prediction Error 
 At the same time as the higher-order brain areas form predictions and communicate these 
predictions to lower-order areas, the lower-order areas must send signals to the higher-order 
areas when these predictions are incorrect. Most studies on prediction error in humans have used 
electroencephalography (EEG) to study event related potentials in the brain, as prediction error 
signals in the brain emerge very quickly and EEG is capable of measuring these signals as they 
occur. The most commonly reported error signals are the error related negativity (ERN), 
mismatch negativity (MMN), P300, N400, and P600. Although most of these error signals are 
elicited by stimuli in multiple sensory modalities, suggesting a common eliciting mechanism, the 
existence of multiple error signals suggests that different mechanisms may drive the detection of 
error. Findings related to these error signals are therefore informative for determining whether 
there is a higher order prediction mechanism that integrates information across modalities.  
1.2.1 Error Related Negativity (ERN) 
The ERN was first reported in two studies that presented a series of stimuli either visually or 
auditorily. When participants made an error in their response, a negativity with a fronto-central 
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maximum was observed 0 to 100 ms after the error (Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, Hoormann, & 
Blanke, 1991; Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1993). Since then, the ERN has been 
the subject of numerous studies and has been found in tasks of various difficulty levels and 
response modalities (for a review, see Weinberg, Dieterich, & Riesel, 2015). In particular, the 
ERN has been implicated in studies of reward processing (e.g., Holroyd, Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, & 
Cohen, 2003), and there is strong evidence that the ERN is generated by the anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC; e.g., Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1993; Dehaene, Posner, & Tucker, 
1994; Ullsperger & von Cramon, 2001), which is thought to integrate pain/punishment and 
gain/reward to drive behavior (Weinberg, Dieterich, & Riesel, 2015). The ACC is thought to 
integrate signals from multiple sensory systems, and it has dense connections to the prefrontal 
cortex and the midbrain dopamine system, suggesting that error signals from the dopamine 
system in response to a reward or loss may be sent to the ACC and then to the prefrontal cortex 
for further processing (for a review, see Weinberg, Dieterich, & Riesel, 2015).   
1.2.2 Mismatch Negativity (MMN) 
The mismatch negativity (MMN) signal has repeatedly been found in auditory tasks in 
which rare sounds are inserted into a sequence of repeated sounds. In these tasks, the MMN 
signal begins around 100-250 ms after the rare deviant sound and is localized in the bilateral 
auditory cortices and in the right frontal cortex (see Kujala, Tervaniemi, and Schröger, 2007, for 
a review). The MMN has also been found in tasks involving much more complex patterns of 
which participants are not consciously aware, such as a rule that short tones must be followed by 
low tones and long tones by high tones (Paavilainen, Arajärvi, & Takegata, 2007). There is some 
evidence that the MMN begins in the bilateral auditory cortices and later is generated by the right 
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frontal cortex (Rinne, Alho, Ilmoniemi, Virtanen, & Näätänen, 2000), suggesting that the error 
signal may be sent from lower- to higher-order brain areas.  
The MMN also has been elicited in tasks involving other modalities, including visual 
processing. For example, Tales, Newton, Troscianko, and Butler (1999) presented a series of 
visual stimuli in the peripheral visual field and interspersed rare deviant stimuli. They found that 
the deviant stimuli elicited a negativity that began 250-400 ms after the stimulus and that 
appeared to be generated by supplemental visual areas in the occipital lobe and posterior 
temporal cortex. They suggested that this negativity is similar to the MMN found in response to 
deviant tones in studies of auditory processing. Czigler, Balázs, and Pató (2004) found a similar 
negativity that began 140-200 ms after the presentation of a deviant visual stimulus. Providing 
further support that this signal is analogous to the auditory MMN, Wei, Chan, and Luo (2002) 
used tasks that required both visual and auditory processing. Participants viewed a series of 
repeated and rare deviant stimuli while at the same time listening to a series of repeated and 
deviant auditory stimuli. In the first block of the task, the participants were instructed to attend to 
the visual stimuli, and in the second block, they were instructed to attend to the auditory stimuli. 
They found a negativity beginning 100-200 ms after the deviant stimuli regardless of modality. 
When participants attended to the auditory stimuli, the negativity was greatest in the temporal 
lobe, whereas when participants attended to the visual stimuli, the negativity was greatest in the 
occipital lobe. Furthermore, 200-250 ms after deviant visual and auditory stimuli, a negativity 
was observed in frontal regions, suggesting the presence of a feed-forward error signal that 
integrated the error signals from both modalities.   
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1.2.3 P300 
The P300 is another signal that is often elicited in tasks involving unpredictable or 
surprising auditory or visual stimuli (for a review, see Polich, 2007). For example, Pollich and 
Margala (1997) presented participants with a series of repeated and deviant auditory stimuli and 
found a positivity approximately 300 ms after the presentation of the deviant stimuli. They found 
the same positivity when rare target tones were presented within periods of silence. A very 
similar response has been observed in tasks involving repeated and rare deviant visual stimuli 
(e.g., Bledowski et al., 2004; Bledowski, Prvulovic, Goebel, Zanella, & Linden, 2004). Although 
there is not a strong consensus about the neural origins of the P300, lesion studies suggest that 
frontal lobe and temporal-parietal junction integrity are necessary for the generation of the P300, 
suggesting that these areas are likely candidates (Pollich, 2007).  
The P300 is actually thought to consist of two distinct signals: the P3a and the P3b. The 
P3a is typically observed when participants passively listen to infrequent tones or view visual 
stimuli that are embedded within a series of repeated stimuli, whereas the P3b is elicited when 
participants must overtly respond to infrequent stimuli that are presented within a series of 
repeated stimuli (for a review, see Pollich, 2007). Pollich (2012) suggests that the P3a is driven 
by attentional processing of novel or unexpected stimuli in the frontal lobe and that the P3b is 
generated when memory storage in temporal-parietal areas is accessed in the service of 
performing a discrimination task. This suggests that the P3a may signal the presence of an error 
in prediction and that, in response to that error, memory stores are accessed to allow for better 
predictions on future trials, generating the P3b.  
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1.2.4 N400 
The N400 has been observed mainly in tasks involving language processing, particularly 
tasks in which stimuli do not match the preceding context. It was first reported in a study in 
which participants read sentences with either semantically congruent or incongruent final words 
(Kutas & Hillyard, 1980). The authors found a negative deflection between 300-600 ms after 
participants read the incongruent words, suggesting that the N400 represents a response to 
semantic errors. Since then, the N400 has been observed in response to many types of 
semantically incongruent stimuli, including to sentences that do not match the context of the 
preceding paragraph (e.g., van Berkum, Brown, & Hagoort, 1999). In addition, van Berkum, 
Brown, Zwisterlood, Kooijman, and Hagoort (2005) found an N400 in response to words that 
were unlikely given the grammatical structure of the sentence. They had participants listen to 
sentences in Dutch, which uses gendered suffixes on adjectives based on the gender of upcoming 
nouns in noun phrases. The authors recorded event related potentials (ERPs) after a gendered 
adjective was presented but before the associated noun was presented. Participants heard 
sentences such as “The burglar had no trouble locating the secret family safe. Of course it was 
situated behind a big, but unobtrusive painting.” In this sentence, the adjective “big” had a neuter 
gender suffix, which was consistent with the gender of the word “painting.” On the other hand, 
the sentence, “Of course, it was situated behind a big, but unobtrusive bookcase,” was 
inconsistent because in this sentence the adjective “big” had an inconsistent gender when in the 
same sentence as the word “bookcase.” The authors found a very large N400 response at the time 
that the prediction-inconsistent nouns were presented. The authors suggested that this ERP 
response meant that people predicted upcoming words based on the structure of current and 
preceding sentences.  
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 The N400 has been localized to a source in the anterior medial temporal lobe, in middle and 
superior temporal areas, inferior temporal areas, and prefrontal areas, including the dorsolateral 
frontal cortex (for a review, see Kutas & Federmeier, 2011). Consistent with the predictive 
coding theory, Kutas and Federmeier (2011) suggested that the N400 actually consists of a wave 
of feed-back activity in response to an unexpected word: The activity begins in the left posterior 
temporal gyrus at 250 ms after word presentation, then spreads to more forward and ventral areas 
in the temporal lobe by 350 ms, and finally spreads to the right anterior temporal lobe and to the 
bilateral frontal lobes by 370-500 ms.  
1.2.5 P600 
The P600 is similar to the N400, in that both have been studied mainly during language 
processing; however, the P600 is observed when syntactic structure is violated, whereas the 
N400 is observed when semantic context is unexpected (for a review, see Swaab, Ledoux, 
Camblin, & Boudewyn, 2012). The P600 was first reported in a study in which participants read 
sentences that either conformed to expected syntactic structure (e.g., “The broker planned to 
conceal the transaction.”) or violated expected syntactic structure (e.g., “The broker persuaded to 
buy the stock.”; Osterhout & Holcomb, 1993). The authors found a slow positive signal around 
600 ms following the word “to” in the sentences that violated syntactic structure. The P600 has 
also been observed for other types of syntactic violations, including gender and case marking 
violations (e.g., Coulson, King, & Cutas, 1998) and verb tense violations (e.g., Osterhout & 
Nicol, 1999). However, some recent research has led to questions about whether the P600 is 
elicited only in response to syntactic violations, as it has also been observed in response to 
certain types of semantic violations (for a review, see Swaab, Ledoux, Camblin, & Boudewyn, 
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2012). Overall, the evidence suggests that the P600 represents a prediction error response to 
stimuli that violate predictions about syntactic, and possibly semantic, structure. 
 There has not been much research attempting to localize the P600 to specific brain areas. In 
one of the few studies discussing the neural generator of the P600, Service, Helenius, Maury, & 
Salmelin, (2007) used MEG while participants read a series of sentences, some of which violated 
syntactic rules and some of which violated semantic rules. They found evidence for both the 
P600 and the N400, and they localized the P600 to the superior temporal cortex, posterior to the 
generator of the N400 response. Brouwer and Hoeks (2013) disagreed with this finding, and used 
existing evidence from neuroimaging studies of language processing to suggest that the P600 
originates from the left inferior frontal gyrus. However, although they provided 
recommendations for future studies meant to support their hypothesis, they did not collect any 
data localizing the P600 to the inferior frontal gyrus. It is therefore difficult to determine whether 
the neural mechanisms underlying the P600 conform to the predictions of predictive coding 
theory. 
1.3 Interim Summary 
 Evidence on prediction formation and prediction error signaling strongly suggests that 
predictive processes occur throughout the brain, from lower-order sensory areas to higher-order 
cortical areas that include the prefrontal cortex. However, the literature provides evidence both 
for and against the hypothesis that there is a higher-order prediction mechanism that drives 
performance across tasks. On one hand, there seem to be similar higher-order brain areas, 
primarily in the frontal cortex, that are activated across tasks requiring prediction formation. In 
addition, many of the error signals are elicited by stimuli in multiple modalities. For example, the 
P300 is sensitive to both simple tone sequences and to complex semantics and the N400 
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responds to sentence-level incongruity as well as situation-level incongruity. On the other hand, 
the fact that different lower-order brain regions are activated during prediction formation 
depending on the task and that there are so many different prediction error responses suggests 
that there may not be a single integrative prediction mechanism. These two possibilities have 
very different implications for individual differences in performance across prediction tasks. If 
there is a higher-order integrative prediction mechanism that drives performance across tasks, 
prediction performance across tasks should be highly correlated. Conversely, if predictions are 
generated separately within each neural system, prediction performance across tasks might not 
be highly correlated due to individual strengths and weaknesses within specific modalities. 
 Discriminating between these alternate possibilities requires the use of tasks that are likely 
to require multiple modalities, as tasks that fall only within a specific modality might not require 
a higher-order integrator. Fortunately, although prediction formation and error signaling are 
often studied separately in different modalities, most real-world tasks do not involve single 
modalities, and even the laboratory tasks discussed above rarely require only a single sensory 
system. For example, the reward prediction literature often uses visual cues to signal upcoming 
rewards (e.g., Ramnani, Elliott, Athwal, & Passingham, 2004; Ernst et al., 2004), which means 
that prediction mechanisms in the visual system and the reward processing system must be active 
at the same time. In fact, in the real world, it is common for people to employ the visual, 
auditory, language, and reward processing systems simultaneously. This strongly suggests the 
presence of a higher-order system that integrates information across modalities in order to make 
adaptive predictions, and given the evidence discussed in the previous sections, this higher-order 
system likely resides in the frontal cortex. However, there is not enough evidence to support the 
delineation of specific areas within the frontal cortex as multimodal integrators and predictors.  
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The tasks used in the current study were chosen because they require prediction across 
multiple modalities and were therefore likely to involve a higher-order cortical prediction 
system. Specifically, the current study used two types of predictive looking tasks, which use eye 
tracking to determine whether participants are making predictions about future input, a 
probabilistic classification task, in which participants use cues to predict which of two outcomes 
will occur, and a gambling task, in which participants predict which choices will lead to the 
highest rewards. I hypothesized that if a higher-order integrative prediction mechanism existed, 
there would be high correlations across these tasks. On the other hand, I hypothesized that if 
predictions were generated separately by modality specific brain systems, correlations across 
these tasks would be low due to individual strengths and weaknesses in different modalities.  
While there have not been any previous studies that have investigated whether 
performance is correlated across the four tasks included in this study, it is informative to examine 
previous research on the similarities and differences in the brain regions and systems activated 
during performance of these tasks. The research literature on these tasks provides evidence both 
for and against the hypothesized integrative prediction mechanism, and the following sections 
therefore discuss prior research on each of these tasks, with an emphasis on the neural 
mechanisms involved in their performance (where this literature exists).   
1.4 Predictive Looking Tasks 
There are two main types of predictive looking tasks: non-verbal predictive looking tasks 
and language predictive looking tasks. In non-verbal predictive looking tasks, participants 
complete short sequences of actions or watch short movies while their eyes are tracked using an 
eye tracker. Researchers are typically interested in whether participants look at objects before 
they are acted upon (e.g., how early participants look at a bowl before the actor picks it up), and 
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these tasks require integration of visual and motor information to make predictions. In language 
predictive looking tasks, participants typically view static images of objects while listening to 
sentences, and researchers are interested in whether participants look at objects before they are 
mentioned in the sentences. These tasks require auditory, visual, and language processing to 
achieve accurate predictions.  
1.4.1 Non-Verbal Predictive Looking Tasks 
Non-verbal predictive looking has been studied in ages ranging from infants to adults. In one 
study, six-, eight-, twelve-, fourteen-, and sixteen-month-old infants were shown short movies of 
a person interacting with a common object (Hunnius & Bekkering, 2010). In these movies, the 
objects were either brought to a correct or incorrect location. For example, in one movie a cup 
was brought to a person’s mouth, while in another movie, a cup was brought to a person’s ear. 
The authors found that infants were more likely to display anticipatory looking to the target 
location when the object and target locations were congruent than when they were incongruent. 
This study suggests that infants as young as six-months-old are capable of making predictions 
about objects and object-related goals. Cannon and Woodward (2012) also studied predictive 
looking in 11-month-old infants. They showed infants movies of a hand making repeated 
reaching movements toward one of two objects. Then, the locations of the objects were switched. 
Infants were more likely to predictively look at the original object rather than at the original 
location, suggesting that they were predicting that the actor would continue interacting with the 
same object rather than simply reacting to the actor’s motion. Falck-Ytter, Gredebäck, and von 
Hofsten (2006) found similar results when they had 12-month-old infants watch a movie of an 
actor placing three toys in a bucket. Infants displayed reliable predictive eye movements to the 
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bucket before the toys contacted the bucket. These studies suggest that infants are capable of 
making goal-directed predictions about future action.   
Studies in adults have also examined goal-directed predictive looking while participants 
carried out an action themselves. For example, Land, Mennie, and Rusted (1999) used eye 
tracking while participants made tea. A head mounted video camera and a second video camera 
located across the room were used to obtain fixation location. The authors found that participants 
first fixated on an object an average of .56 seconds before touching the object and that 
participants fixated the next object an average of .61 seconds before finishing their use of the 
previous object. In a very similar study, participants made a sandwich while their gaze location 
was tracked using an eye tracker. The authors found that 30% of the reaches to objects were 
preceded by a fixation to that object within the previous eight seconds (Hayhoe, Shrivastava, 
Mruczek, & Pelz, 2003). In another study, participants grasped a bar and moved it around an 
obstacle toward a target. Participants looked at the grasp site on the bar and at the target before 
making contact with the bar and the target. In addition, participants stopped fixating these objects 
after contact was made (Johansson, Westling, Bäckström, & Flanagan, 2001).  
Not only do adults engage in predictive looking when performing a task themselves, but 
they also perform goal-directed predictive looking when watching someone else complete a task. 
Flanagan and Johansson (2003) had participants both stack blocks themselves and watch an actor 
stack the blocks in the same manner. The authors found that in both the passive and the active 
trials, almost all fixations were directed to the sites of contact on the blocks and the locations 
where the blocks were to be set down. In addition, in both types of trials, participants’ fixations 
occurred an average of 150 ms before contact actually occurred. In another study, Elsner, Falck-
Ytter, & Gredebäck (2012) created 12 s movies of point-light displays by attaching markers to a 
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hand moving laterally in space. They created two motion conditions: a biological motion 
condition in which the hand moved naturally and a non-biological motion condition in which the 
hand moved at a constant velocity. In both movies the hand moved toward and contacted a target 
object that was partially occluded by a barrier. In a between-subjects design, participants 
watched either the biological or the non-biological motion movies ten times while their eyes 
were tracked using an eye tracker. The authors found that participants in the biological motion 
condition looked at the target object an average of 124 ms before contact occurred. On the other 
hand, participants in the non-biological motion condition looked at the target object an average 
of 21.5 ms after contact occurred, which the authors stated constitutes reactive, rather than 
predictive, looking. This study suggests that people are equipped to be able to predict future 
biological motion, whereas people are less able to predict non-biological motion. From an 
evolutionary perspective, this would make sense, as living organisms are much more likely to 
move around on a regular basis that non-living objects.   
Building on this literature, Eisenberg, Zacks, and Flores (in prep) developed a novel 
paradigm, called the Predictive Looking at Action Task (PLAT) to assay predictive looking 
while participants watch videos of actors performing everyday activities. Unlike the studies 
discussed above that used short videos of an actor interacting with only one object, the PLAT 
uses movies during which an actor interacts with many objects sequentially. In preliminary work, 
twenty-five participants passively watched three five-to-six minute long videos of an actor 
completing an everyday activity (e.g., making breakfast, preparing for a party). For each movie, 
the points at which the actor came into contact with a new object were identified and 500 ms bins 
were created for the three seconds before each point of contact. Both the proportion of 
participants who looked at the target object and participants’ fixation time on the target object 
  21 
increased as time to contact approached (See Figure 1). These results suggest that the PLAT can 
provide an online measure of prediction ability. This same pattern of results was replicated in 
another study of twenty-eight participants. Additional analyses using these two data sets also 
found that predictive looking decreased around event boundaries, suggesting that participants 
formed event models while viewing these movies, and that they updated their event models when 
predictions became more difficult (Eisenberg & Zacks, in preparation).  
 
Figure 1. Results from Eisenberg, Zacks, and Flores (in prep) for the PLAT. The figure on the 
left displays the proportion of participants who looked at the target object during each of the six 
500 ms bins. The figure on the right displays the amount of time participants looked at the target 
object during each of the six bins. For both figures, the time bins progress in time from left to 
right from 3000-2500 ms before the actor contacted the target object to 500-0 ms before the actor 
contacted the target object  
 
1.4.2 Language Predictive Looking Tasks 
Language-related predictive looking tasks typically use the visual world paradigm to 
investigate anticipatory language processing in adults. In the visual world paradigm, participants 
view an array of objects on a computer screen while listening to a sentence. An eye tracker is 
used to determine the point at which participants begin looking at the next object to be 
mentioned in the sentence. In one of the earliest studies investigating anticipatory eye 
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movements while participants looked at an array of images, Altmann and Kamide (1999) had 
participants listen to sentences such as “The boy will move the cake” or “The boy will eat the 
cake” while viewing a collection of images that, in this example, included depictions of a boy, a 
cake, and various toys. In one version of each sentence, the verb could only apply to one of the 
images (in this example, only the cake could be eaten), and in the other version, the verb could 
apply to all of the objects (in this example, all of the objects could be moved). The authors found 
that participants began looking at the cake much earlier when the sentence included the word 
“eat” than when the sentence included the word “move.” In a similar study, Kamide, Altmann, 
and Haywood (2003) had participants listen to sentences such as “The woman will spread the 
butter on the bread.” The authors found that participants looked at the goal object (the bread, in 
this case), immediately after they heard the referring expression (spread the butter). In another 
study, Altmann and Kamide (2007) used a similar paradigm but varied the tense of the verbs in 
the sentences. For example, participants heard sentences such as, “the man will drink” or “the 
man has drunk” while viewing a screen with both a full glass of beer and an empty wine glass. 
Participants looked more often at the object that matched the tense of the verb in the sentence, 
even before the target object was mentioned. These studies suggest that people engage in 
predictive looking during language processing as well as when they view short movie clips of 
human actions. 
1.5 Probabilistic Classification Tasks 
In probabilistic classification tasks, participants are asked to classify stimuli into two or 
more categories. Participants usually receive feedback after each trial, allowing them to learn to 
predict the category of subsequent items. Although these tasks are typically used to measure 
executive control, rather than prediction ability, these tasks require participants to learn 
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information over a series of trials and use this information to make subsequent predictions. There 
are a variety of probabilistic classification tasks that require participants to use previously 
learned information to respond on subsequent trials, including the weather prediction task and 
the Mr. Potato Head task.    
In the weather prediction task (Knowlton, Squire, & Gluck, 1994), participants see 
various combinations of four cards with simple geometric designs and are asked to predict, on 
the basis of these cards, whether there will be rain or sun. The four cards are associated with 
75%, 57%, 43%, or 25% probability with one of the outcomes. Participants receive feedback 
after each trial. Using this task, Knowlton, Squire, and Gluck (1994) found that after 50 trials, 
healthy participants performed above chance, choosing the optimal answer on an average of 
68.2% of the trials. After 350 trials, healthy participants chose the optimal answer on an average 
of 74% of the trials. Gluck, Shohamy, and Myers (2002) found similar results, finding that after 
200 trials, participants chose the optimal answer on an average of over 70% of the trials.  
In a very similar paradigm, Shohamy et al. (2004) created probabilistically predictive 
stimuli using a Mr. Potato Head doll. In this study, four features of the Mr. Potato Head doll 
could vary, and participants had to use this information to predict whether each Mr. Potato Head 
customer at an ice cream shop wanted vanilla or chocolate ice cream. They found that healthy 
adult participants made optimal predictions on approximately 80% of the trials, which is 
consistent with findings from the weather prediction task. Aron et al. (2004) found almost 
identical results in another sample of participants using the same Mr. Potato Head task, with 
participants making optimal predictions on an average of approximately 70-80% of trials. 
In addition to this behavioral replication, Aron et al. (2004) used fMRI to determine the 
brain areas involved in making these predictions. Specifically, they broke the trials down into 
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three phases: stimulus, delay, and feedback. Of these phases, activation during the delay was 
most relevant to prediction, as it was during this time that participants most likely made their 
predictions about ice cream flavor. The authors found significant activation in the right inferior 
frontal cortex, caudate nucleus, parietal cortex, and cerebellum during this delay. In addition, 
they found significant deactivation in the medial prefrontal cortex, medial temporal cortex, and 
parietal cortex. The authors then correlated neural activity with the degree of uncertainty on each 
trial. They found a significant positive correlation between activity in a region of interest in the 
midbrain (centered on the substantia nigra) and increasing uncertainty during the delay period. 
The authors therefore suggested that this midbrain region codes for uncertainty when people 
make predictions. Finally, the authors examined the functional connectivity of this midbrain 
region with the rest of the brain, and found significant correlations between activity in this region 
and ventral striatum, orbitofrontal cortex, and dorsomedial frontal cortex, suggesting that feed-
forward and feed-back connections drive performance on this task.  
In another type of probabilistic classification task, participants viewed a series of eight 
rapidly presented circles and triangles. Participants then predicted whether the next stimulus was 
likely to be a circle or a triangle. The amount of uncertainty on each trial varied depending on 
how many circles and triangles were presented during the stimulus presentation phase. For 
example, if all of the stimuli were circles, there was an 80% probability that the next stimulus 
would be a circle as well. On the other hand, when there was an equal number of each type of 
stimulus presented during the stimulus presentation phase, there was a 50% probability that the 
next stimulus would be a circle. The authors found that even though participants were never told 
about these different probabilities, participants quickly began to use the probabilities to help 
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them make their predictions; as uncertainty decreased, participants made more confident and 
correct decisions (Huettel, Song, & McCarthy, 2005).   
In the same study, Huettel, Song, and McCarthy (2005) used fMRI to examine the brain 
regions activated while participants performed this task. They found that bilateral insula, inferior 
frontal gyrus, and intraparietal sulcus, along with right thalamus, and right inferior parietal lobule 
displayed a significant increase in activation as uncertainty increased. In addition, the authors 
analyzed the data to determine whether the order in which stimuli were presented affected the 
neural response. They found that when a stimulus that was incongruent with the preceding 
stimuli was presented late in a trial, the posterior parietal cortex, specifically, the intraparietal 
sulcus, displayed significantly greater activation compared to trials in which an incongruent 
stimulus was presented early in the trial. The authors suggested that the activation in this region 
represents the neural correlates of the attempted resolution of uncertainty and, therefore, the 
formation of a prediction about the target stimulus. In addition, based on previous research, the 
authors suggested that while activity in the posterior parietal cortex reflects uncertainty about 
which behavior to choose and the ultimate resolution of this uncertainty, the activity they 
observed in the anterior insula is likely related to uncertainty about future reward outcomes. 
1.6 Gambling Tasks 
In the Iowa gambling task, participants are shown four decks of cards, are given a starting 
amount of money, and are told to choose cards such that they make the most money and lose the 
least money. When participants choose to turn over a card from the A or B decks, they usually 
earn $100. When they choose to turn over a card from the C or D decks, participants usually earn 
$50. However, every once in a while, turning over a card results in a penalty, with a larger 
penalty associated with the A and B decks. This penalty occurs randomly, meaning that 
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participants have no way of knowing when they will incur this penalty. Because of the high 
penalties associated with the A and B decks, choosing cards from decks C and D results in the 
higher scores on this task. In the first study using this task, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, and 
Damasio (1997) measured participants’ skin conductance (SCR) while they completed this task. 
The authors found that healthy participants began choosing more cards from decks C and D and 
began showing a higher SCR when choosing a card from decks A and B between the 10th-50th 
cards, despite being unable to verbalize whether one deck was better than the other. This pattern 
became very strong during trials 50-80, when participants began to express the possibility that 
decks C and D were better and continued to show a high SCR when choosing cards from decks C 
and D. During the last 20 trials, the pattern of choices remained relatively unchanged, but most 
participants were confident that decks C and D resulted in the most advantageous outcome. 
During this final phase, SCR remained high for decks A and B but became lower for decks C and 
D, suggesting that participants no longer experienced as much concern when choosing cards 
from decks C and D. The results of this study suggest that participants begin making predictions 
about which deck will result in less monetary loss, even before they become consciously aware 
of these predictions.  
There have been multiple fMRI studies examining neural activity while participants 
perform the Iowa gambling task. In the first fMRI study of this task, Fukui, Murai, Fukuyama, 
Hayashi, and Hanakawa (2005) examined the selection period during which participants made 
their choice about which deck to choose. The behavioral results replicated those of Bechara et al. 
(1997), demonstrating that participants began preferentially choosing cards from the 
advantageous decks beginning around trial 40 of 100. In addition, they found significant 
activation in the medial prefrontal cortex when participants chose cards from the risky decks 
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compared to the safe decks. Furthermore, the more successful participants were on the task, the 
greater the activity in this same region. The authors suggest that when deciding which deck to 
choose, participants create an estimate of the probability of gain versus loss, and that it is this 
prediction that is represented in the activity in the medial prefrontal cortex.  
Lawrence, Jollant, O’Daly, Zelaya, and Phillips (2009) found similar results in their 
fMRI study of seventeen men who completed a similar version of the Iowa gambling task. They 
again replicated the original Bechara et al. (1997) behavioral results. In addition, they compared 
brain activity during the selection period compared to activity in a control task in which 
participants were told which choices to make, and they found significant increased activation in 
the medial orbito-frontal cortex and the ventral anterior cingulate cortex. Furthermore, when they 
compared activation during the selection period on trials in which participants chose the risky 
decks compared to trials when participants chose the safe decks, they found increased activation 
during risky decisions in the medial frontal gyrus, lateral orbitofrontal cortex, insula, and the 
occipital cortex. Providing further support for these results, another fMRI study found a 
correlation between expected gain and activation in the hippocampus, superior frontal gyrus, 
right medial frontal gyrus, inferior frontal gyrus, inferior orbito-frontal cortex, right amygdala, 
insula, and orbito-frontal/ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Li, Lu, D’Argembeau, Ng, and 
Bechara, 2010). The authors suggest that the amygdala sends a signal to the orbito-
frontal/ventromedial prefrontal cortex when the potential for risk is present, and that the orbito-
frontal/ventromedial prefrontal cortex then allows for conscious processing of the risk and 
resulting decision. Although the authors do not explicitly mention prediction when discussing 
these results, it seems likely that the activity in the orbito-frontal/ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
reflects predictions about gains and losses occurring during the decision making process. 
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In sum, non-verbal predictive looking tasks, language predictive looking tasks, 
probabilistic classification tasks, and gambling tasks all require the use of prior information to 
make predictions about future input. In addition, although they depend primarily on different 
sensory modalities, they all overlap in their use of visual processing. On the other hand, there are 
some clear differences between the tasks. Both predictive looking tasks use information stored 
primarily in semantic memory, whereas the probabilistic classification and gambling tasks rely 
on working and short-term memory to make predictions. In addition, the measurement tools 
differ across the tasks, with performance on the predictive looking tasks measured using 
oculomotor data and performance on the probabilistic classification and gambling tasks 
measured using accuracy data. The tasks also have similarities and differences at the neural level. 
Although there are little EEG or imaging data available for the predictive looking tasks, the 
literature discussed earlier on predictions in the visual and language processing systems suggest 
that these tasks likely involve feed-back and feed-forward signals between lower-order areas and 
the frontal lobe. Similarly, imaging data for the probabilistic classification and gambling tasks 
suggest that information related to prediction is activated in the lower-order and higher-order 
brain areas, again suggesting the presence of feed-back and feed-forward connections. The 
behavioral and neural similarities between these tasks suggest that similar mechanisms may 
support performance on all of these tasks and that these tasks may load onto a single factor that 
represents overall prediction ability.  
To test whether performance on these types of tasks involves a higher-order integrative 
prediction system, the current study included the PLAT, the visual world paradigm, the weather 
prediction task, and the Iowa gambling task. The visual world, weather prediction, and Iowa 
gambling tasks were chosen because all three have been the focus on extensive research. While 
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the PLAT is a relatively new task, it was chosen because preliminary research found that it 
reliably measured predictive looking during viewing of naturalistic movies and because eye 
tracking may allow for a more sensitive measure of prediction than an overt behavioral response.  
Surprisingly, there are extremely few studies that have previously investigated whether 
performance is correlated across any combination of these types of tasks, and there have not been 
any previous studies that have combined three or more of these tasks into a single study. The few 
studies that have investigated performance on two of the tasks were both focused on performance 
in clinical populations (HIV/AIDS and schizophrenia) and used only the Iowa gambling task and 
the weather prediction task (Gonzalez, Wardle, Jacobus, Vassileva, & Martin-Thormeyer, 2010; 
Wasserman, Barry, Bradford, Delva, & Beninger, 2012). Both studies found that performance 
across these tasks was not as similar as expected, though neither study included a control group 
of healthy participants. It is therefore not possible to determine from these previous studies 
whether this lack of relationship between the two tasks would generalize to healthy populations.  
In addition to completing these prediction tasks, participants also completed tasks 
involving crystallized and fluid intelligence to ensure that similarities among these tasks were 
not completely explained by other areas of cognitive functioning. The current study therefore 
tested whether there was a unique factor that explained shared variance across the prediction 
tasks, even when the fluid and crystallized intelligence tasks were included in the model.  
In addition to furthering understanding of predictive processing, this study can inform 
applied research with clinical populations. For example, people with Posttraumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD) often experience hypervigilance and engage in constant surveillance of the 
environment to prevent themselves from experiencing a reoccurrence of their traumatic event 
(Ehlers & Clark, 2000); in other words, they make often erroneous predictions about potential 
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dangers in their environment. To illustrate, a military veteran might anticipate the presence of 
enemy soldiers around every corner, even though these predictions are incorrect. In addition, 
research has found that people with PTSD display increased arousal not only in response to 
threat-related information, but also in response to novel, demanding, or unpredictable cues 
(Stam, 2007) and that people with PTSD have deficits on neutral attention tasks, primarily with 
inhibiting responses to distracters (Vasterling, Brailey, Constans, & Sutker, 1998). In fact, in a 
recent study in our laboratory, we found that people with PTSD made slower and less accurate 
predictions about everyday activity compared to controls (Eisenberg, Zacks, Rodebaugh, & 
Flores, in prep). Furthermore, imaging studies have found reduced activity in the dopamine 
system in combat veterans (van Wingen et al., 2012), increased activity in the striatum in people 
with PTSD (e.g., Linnman, Zeffiro, Pitman & Milad, 2011; Falconer et al., 2008), and increased 
activity in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex in people with PTSD (e.g., Shin & Liberzon, 
2010). These studies suggest that feed-back and feed-forward signaling necessary for successful 
predictions may be different in people with PTSD compared to people without PTSD. Because 
these studies suggest that people with PTSD make incorrect predictions about future stimuli and 
have difficulty inhibiting responses to distracters, I hypothesized that people with PTSD also 
have difficulty on other tasks that require correct predictions. Therefore, the present study 
screened participants for the presence of PTSD symptomology to determine whether people with 
higher PTSD severity experience difficulty with a variety of tasks involving prediction.  
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Chapter 2: Methods 
2. 1 Participants 
 Two hundred seventy-six participants were recruited from the student participant pool at 
Washington University. Fifty participants were dropped from analyses because they did not 
complete both sessions of the study (26), the eye tracker could not track their eyes and no eye 
tracking data was collected (14), they were not fluent in English (3), they did not follow task 
instructions (4), or computer problems prevented them from completing the first session (3). An 
additional 15 participants were dropped from only the visual world task analyses because these 
participants were missing eye tracking data for more than 20% of the trials on this task but had 
adequate data for the other tasks. This left data from 226 participants for all but the visual world 
task and data from 211 participants for the visual world task. All analyses on single tasks and all 
simple pairwise correlations that did not involve the visual world task included data from all 226 
participants. All modeling was conducted with data only from the 211 participants with full data 
sets. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 59 (mean = 19.73), and were 64% female. The study 
took place over two sessions: a group testing session that lasted 1.5 hours and an individual eye 
tracking session that lasted 1 hour. 
2. 2 Eye-Tracking 
 An EyeLink 1000 eye tracker was used to collect oculometric measures. This eye tracker 
records data at 1000 Hz. Gaze location was the measure of particular interest; however, we also 
collected other oculometric measures including pupil size, fixation duration and saccade 
distance. Participants were required to keep their head in the headrest throughout all of the tasks 
requiring eye tracking. Nine-point calibration followed by validation of the resulting calibration 
was used; however when nine-point calibration did not allow for adequate calibration, thirteen-
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point calibration was used. If both nine-point and 13-point calibration failed, five-point 
calibration was used. The infrared illuminator was initially set to 75% illumination; if calibration 
failed at this illumination it was adjusted to either 50% illumination or 100% illumination 
depending on which level of illumination provided the best calibration. After successful 
calibration and validation, the experimenter used a simulated pupil of known size printed on an 
index card to calibrate the pupil size measure, because the eye-tracker measures pupil size in 
pixels rather than in millimeters. All eye-tracking tasks were presented on a 19-inch (74 cm) 
monitor (1440x900 resolution, viewing distance of 58 cm from the forehead rest, viewing angle 
of 38.6o) using the Experiment Builder software designed by S-R Research (http://www.sr-
research.com) to be used with this eye tracker. 
2.3 Procedure 
 Participants first completed the group session. During the group session, participants 
reviewed the consent form and completed the demographics questionnaire. Participants were 
then told to begin the tasks on the computer. All computer tasks were presented on 23-inch (58.4 
cm) monitors, with a viewing distance of 68.5 cm. Each task began once the previous task was 
complete, with no intervention from the experimenter. Participants began by completing the 
weather prediction task and then the Iowa gambling task. They then completed the letter sets 
task, followed by the synonym and antonym vocabulary tasks. Participants continued with the 
paper folding task and then the Information task. They finished the group session by completing 
the Raven’s Progressive Matrices task. During the individual eye tracking session, participants 
completed the PLAT and then the visual world task. They then filled out the PTSD 
questionnaires. They were given a debriefing form explaining the purpose of the study before 
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they left this session. (See Table 1 for a list of the tasks participants completed in each session of 
the study.) 
Table 1. List of tasks within each session of the study. 
Group Session  
 Demographics Questionnaire 
 Weather Prediction 
 Iowa Gambling  
 Letter Sets   
 Synonym   
 Antonym   
 Paper Folding  
 Information   
 Raven's Progressive Matrices 
   
Individual Eye Tracking Session 
 Predictive Looking at Action 
 Visual World  
 PTSD Questionnaires 
 
2.4 Measures 
2.4.1 Demographics 
Participants completed a short demographic questionnaire that included age, gender, 
handedness, ethnicity, current employment, highest level of education, history of major medical 
problems, and hours of exercise.  
2.4.2 PTSD Questionnaires 
Participants first completed the Life Events Checklist for DSM-5 (LEC-5; Weathers, Blake, 
Schnurr, Kaloupek, Marx, & Keane, 2013), which included 17 questions about a variety of 
potentially traumatic events and eight additional questions about the severity of the most severe 
event. Participants then completed the PTSD Checklist for DSM-5 (PCL-5; Weathers, Litz, 
Keane, Palmieri, P.A., Marx, & Schnurr, 2013), which consisted of 20 questions assessing the 
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severity of all DSM-5 PTSD symptoms participants experienced over the past month. The 
National Center for PTSD has proposed a cut-point of 33, at or above which someone would be 
classified as having probable clinical PTSD, though they note that this could change after further 
research (National Center for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder). The PCL-5 has strong internal 
consistency (α = .94), test-retest reliability (r = .82), and convergent and divergent validity 
(Blevins, Weathers, Davis, Witte, & Domino, 2015). 
2.4.3 Crystallized and Fluid Intelligence Tasks 
Participants completed three tasks testing crystallized intelligence and three tasks testing 
fluid intelligence. The crystallized intelligence tasks included the Information Test (Wechsler, 
2008) and the Synonym and Antonym Vocabulary tasks (Salthouse, 1993). The Information Test 
required participants to answer general knowledge questions in a variety of areas, and a meta-
analysis suggests that this measure has a test-retest reliability of 0.92 (Calamia, Markon, & 
Tranel, 2013). The Synonym vocabulary (Chronbach’s alpha = .67) and Antonym vocabulary 
(Chronbach’s alpha = .79) tasks required participants to choose synonyms or antonyms, 
respectively, from among five possible choices (Salthouse, 2001).  
The fluid intelligence tasks included a paper folding task (Ekstrom, French, Harman, & 
Dermen, 1976), a letter sets task (Ekstrom, French, Harman, & Dermen, 1976), and the odd 
numbered questions in the Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices Set II (Raven, 1990). For the 
paper folding task, participants were shown a sequence in which a square piece of paper was 
folded. The final image in the sequence showed where a pencil was poked through one location 
on the folded paper. Participants had to choose which of five options correctly displayed the 
locations of the holes on the unfolded piece of paper. Participants completed two sets of ten 
questions each. They were given three minutes for each set of questions. Each question was 
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presented by itself on the computer screen and participants were allowed to click a button to skip 
questions if they chose. For the letter sets task, participants were shown five strings of four 
letters each. Participants were instructed to choose the string that did not match the pattern that 
the remainder of the letter strings followed. Participants were given seven minutes to complete 
fifteen questions. Reliability data is not available in the literature for the Letter Sets and Paper 
Folding tasks. Therefore split-half reliability for these tasks was calculated using data from the 
current study (see results section for the results of these analyses). The Raven’s Advanced 
Progressive Matrices task required participants to choose which of eight items completed the 
pattern shown at the top of the screen. The correct item matched the pattern vertically and 
horizontally. Participants were given ten minutes to complete eighteen questions (Kane et al., 
1990). The Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices has high internal consistency (Chronbach’s 
alpha = .83; Paul, 1985) and test-retest reliability (r = .83; Bors & Forrin, 1995) 
2.4.4 Prediction Battery 
The prediction battery consisted of four different tasks: the predictive looking at action task 
(PLAT), a visual world task (Altmann & Kamide, 1999), a weather prediction task (Knowlton, 
Squire, & Gluck, 1994), and the Iowa gambling task (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, and Damasio, 
1997).  
As described earlier, the PLAT is a novel task that we have recently developed in the 
laboratory. For this task, participants passively watched 5-6 minute movies of an actor 
performing everyday activities while their eyes were tracked using an eye tracker. These movies 
included many goal-directed sequences of activity in which the actor orients toward an object, 
picks up the object, and then completes an action with that object. Predictive performance on this 
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task was measured by examining how early participants looked at objects before the actor came 
into contact with them. This task allowed for a relatively continuous measure of prediction.  
To calculate performance on this task, an experimenter first identified all of the time points 
at which the actor came into contact with an object. Dynamic interest areas were then drawn 
around each contacted object. The dynamic interest areas were placed to capture fixations on the 
object of interest ranging from 3000 ms before contact to 1000 ms after contact. Interest areas 
were placed using the following rules: (1) All interest areas were rectangular in shape, (2) No 
interest areas were allowed to overlap in time and space, (3) If potential interest areas 
overlapped, only the first interest area was kept, (4) If the actor contacted an object by touching 
it with another object, the object in direct contact with the actor was considered the object of 
interest (e.g., if the actor put a bowl on the counter, the bowl was considered the object of 
interest), (5) Only objects that were fully onscreen when contacted were considered objects of 
interest, (6) If the longest dimension of an object was smaller than 105 pixels (visual angle of 
2.9°), the interest area was created around the entire object, and if the longest dimension of an 
object was larger than 105 pixels, the interest area was created around the part of the object that 
the actor contacted, and (7) For objects smaller than 48 pixels (visual angle of 1.3°) on any side, 
interest areas were created with a minimum size of 48 pixels per side. (See Figure 2 for an 
example movie frame with an interest area highlighted). 
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Figure 2. An example frame taken from one of the three movies used in this study. The yellow 
box represents the interest area, which was drawn around the chandelier—the object the actor is 
about to contact in order to put up the streamer. The purple dot represents the gaze location of an 
example participant who watched this movie. Here, the participant looked at the chandelier 
before the actor contacted it. During the study, participants saw neither the yellow box nor their 
own gaze location.  
 
 Once these dynamic interest areas were created in Data Viewer, the amount of time 
participants spent fixating within each interest area during the 3000 ms before contact was 
calculated. The 3000 ms before contact was divided into thirty 100 ms bins, and bins with more 
than 20% of the eye tracking data missing were dropped from later analyses. Growth curve 
modeling was conducted using the lmer package in R (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) 
to obtain growth estimates over the 30 time bins for the random effect of subjects. Growth curve 
modeling provides an estimate of how performance on a task changes over time and tests 
whether allowing each subject’s growth over time to have different intercepts, linear slopes, 
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and/or quadratic slopes improves the fit of the model. All variables entered into the growth curve 
models were z-scored to ensure that the variances were at a similar scale. Three models were 
tested: 1) a model that only allowed the intercept to vary by subject, 2) a model that allowed the 
intercept and linear slope to vary by subject, and 3) a model that allowed the intercept and both 
the linear and quadratic slopes to vary by subject. For all of these models, movie was also 
included as a random effect, but only the intercept was allowed to vary by movie.  
 For the visual world task (Altmann & Kamide, 1999), the eye-tracker was used to obtain 
participants’ gaze location while they viewed arrays of objects and listened to sentences that 
included some of the objects. The sentences all had the following structure: an article, a noun, a 
verb, a person’s name, and a noun that was the subject of the verb (e.g., The boy kicked Tracy’s 
ball). On some trials, the verb was predictive of only one object in the array (predictive trials; 12 
trials of this type per subject), while on other trials, the verb was not predictive of any individual 
object in the array (unpredictive trials; 12 trials of this type per subject). For example, one array 
of objects included a picture of football, a tennis ball, a toy truck, and a piece of broccoli. The 
predictive sentence was, “The woman steamed Paul’s broccoli,” and the unpredictive sentence 
was, “The woman put away Paul’s broccoli” (See Figure 3). Predictive looking was measured by 
determining how much earlier participants looked at the target picture while listening to 
predictive sentences than while listening to unpredictive sentences. Three types of control 
sentences were also included: 1) the verb predicted two of the objects (8 trials per subject), 2) the 
verb predicted three of the objects (8 trials per subject), and 3) the verb did not apply to any of 
the objects (20 trials per subject). Participants heard a beep immediately after the end of each 
sentence, and they were instructed to press one button if they thought the sentence applied to any 
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of the pictures on the screen and press a different button if they thought the sentence did not 
apply to any of the pictures. They were told to wait until they heard the beep to respond.  
 
 
Figure 3. Example stimulus from the visual world task. The predictive sentence for this trial was 
“The woman steamed Paul’s broccoli,” and the unpredictive sentence was “The woman put away 
Paul’s broccoli.”  
To calculate performance on this task, an experimenter first determined the amount of time 
between the verb and the subject in each predictive and unpredictive sentence, hereafter referred 
to as verb-subject distance. The verb-subject distance ranged from 1406 ms to 2400 ms (mean = 
1892.68 ms). Then, the proportion of time spent looking at the target object during the verb-
subject distance during the predictive sentences was calculated. To ensure that the amount of 
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time spent looking at the target object was not due to the salience of that particular object, a 
control measure of looking time was calculated using the same object in the matched 
unpredictive sentence that only differed in the verb. Because each participant only heard one 
version of each sentence, the mean looking time across participants who heard the unpredictive 
sentence was used as the control for each predictive sentence.  
For the weather prediction task (Knowlton, Squire, & Gluck, 1994), participants were told to 
use cues to predict whether there would be rain or sun. On each trial, they saw one, two, or three 
cards, each with geometric symbols. Each combination of cards had a different probability of 
predicting each outcome. For example, if cards three and four were presented, there was a .1 
probability of rain, whereas if cards one and two were presented, there was a .9 probability of 
rain (See Figure 4 for an example trial from this task). Each combination of cards was presented 
in a random order with the frequency displayed in the P(cue) column of Table 2. (See Table 2 for 
the cue card combinations, the frequency with which each combination was presented, and the 
probability of rain given each combination.) Participants completed 200 trials of this task. For 
each trial, prediction ability was measured by determining whether participants chose the optimal 
response based on the cues given. Trials for which the probability of rain was 0.50 were scored 
as correct regardless of the response given. The resulting accuracy scores for each trial were 
entered into a logistic growth curve model using the lmer package in R (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, 
& Walker, 2015), with trial number as the time variable and trial by trial accuracy as the 
dependent variable. The logistic slope was allowed to vary randomly by subject. Trial number 
was z-scored to improve numerical precision.  
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Figure 4. Example trial from the weather prediction task. 
 
Table 2: Design of Weather Prediction Task (Modified from 
Knowlton, Squire, & Gluck, 1994) 
 Cue    
Pattern 1 2 3 4   P (cue) P (rain) 
1 0 0 0 1  0.14 0.15 
2 0 0 1 0  0.084 0.38 
3 0 0 1 1  0.087 0.1 
4 0 1 0 0  0.084 0.62 
5 0 1 0 1  0.064 0.18 
6 0 1 1 0  0.047 0.5 
7 0 1 1 1  0.041 0.21 
8 1 0 0 0  0.14 0.85 
9 1 0 0 1  0.058 0.5 
10 1 0 1 0  0.064 0.82 
11 1 0 1 1  0.032 0.43 
12 1 1 0 0  0.087 0.9 
13 1 1 0 1  0.032 0.57 
14 1 1 1 0  0.041 0.79 
 
 Finally, participants completed the Iowa gabling task on the computer. For each of 100 
trials, participants were told to choose a card from one of four decks. Participants were told to 
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choose cards to earn as much money as possible over the course of the task. Choosing cards from 
the A and B decks resulted in large gains but larger losses and choosing cards from the C and D 
decks resulted in small gains and smaller losses. The optimal strategy on this task was to choose 
cards from the C and D decks. Participants could choose their own strategy for picking cards 
from the decks, but after choosing forty cards from a single deck, that deck disappeared, and 
participants had to start picking from one of the other decks. (See Figure 5 for an example trial 
from the Iowa Gambling task.) Responses were scored as correct if the participant chose from 
one of the decks that resulted in a higher long-term payout (decks C or D). A final score for this 
task was calculated by summing the total number of correct responses over the one hundred trials 
of this task. See the Results section for split-half reliability measures for this and each of the 
other prediction tasks. 
 
Figure 5. Example trial of the Iowa Gambling task. Participants began with $2,000 in their cash 
pile and earned or lost money by choosing from decks A through D. 
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2.4.5 Processing Speed 
None of the tasks included in the battery described above directly tested processing speed; 
however, response times for all of the tasks were collected, allowing for an approximation of 
processing speed to be calculated. Originally, we planned to include response times for the visual 
world task, the weather prediction task, the synonym vocabulary task, and the antonym 
vocabulary task. However, as discussed in the results section below, preliminary analyses found 
that the response times for these tasks did not correlate, and we therefore decided to use only the 
response time for the visual world task, as this seemed the purest measure of processing speed 
available from the battery of tasks. 
2.5 Modeling 
Confirmatory factor analysis was used to determine whether the cognitive ability measures 
loaded onto the predicted latent variables, and whether the predictive processing tasks loaded 
onto the hypothesized latent variable. Model fit was calculated using the Tucker-Lewis Index 
(TLI), the Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR), the comparative fit index (CFI), 
and the root-mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA). The TLI compares the chi-square 
value of the model to the chi-square of the null-model (which specifies that there are no 
correlations among the measured variables) and takes into account model complexity; the SRMR 
is the square root of the difference between the residuals of the sample covariance matrix and the 
hypothesized covariance model; the CFI compares the fitted model with the null model, which 
specifies that the covariance of the variables is 0; and the RMSEA provides an estimate of how 
well the model fits the population covariance matrix. Hu and Bentler (1999) suggest that for 
sample sizes under 500, model fit is considered good when the TLI is greater than .95 and the 
SRMR is less than .09. They also suggest that model fit is good when the CFI is .95 or higher 
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and the RMSEA is .06 or lower. In addition, because of the relatively small sample size, the 
Swain correction (Herzog, Boomsma, & Reinecke, 2007), which reduces the bias of model fit 
estimators when the ratio of sample size to the number of estimated parameters is at least two to 
one, was used to correct bias in the TLI, CFI, and RMSEA. It was planned a priori to use 
structural equation modeling to test the model shown in Figure 6 if the confirmatory factor 
analyses found that the hypothesized prediction and general cognitive functioning latent 
variables provided a good fit for the data. 
 
 An additional model that included PTSD symptom severity was also tested to determine 
whether higher PTSD symptom severity affects prediction ability and general cognitive 
Figure 6. Proposed model structure with all four of the prediction tasks loading onto a predictive 
processing latent variable. This predictive processing latent variable was hypothesized to load 
onto the general cognitive functioning variable, and the crystallized and fluid intelligence 
constructs were hypothesized to load onto the general cognitive functioning latent variable. 
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functioning. The hypothesized model that includes PTSD symptom severity is shown in Figure 
7. 
 
 Finally, an additional model, in which the fluid and crystallized intelligence constructs 
predict performance on each of the prediction tasks, was also tested to determine whether 
performance on the prediction tasks was simply a combination of other forms of cognitive 
functioning rather than a separate construct. This model is shown Figure 8. 
 
Figure 7. Model structure with PTSD as an additional predictor of general cognitive functioning 
and predictive processing. 
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Figure 8. Model structure with crystallized and fluid intelligence constructs predicting 
performance on each of the prediction tasks. 
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Chapter 3: Results 
3.1 Individual Task Performance 
3.1.1 PTSD Questionnaires 
 Total PTSD severity scores and symptom cluster scores were calculated for each 
participant (mean = 10.65, SD = 13.10, range: 0 to 60). The suggested cut-off score for probable 
PTSD is 33 (National Center for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, and only 19 participants had a 
score of 33 or above. See Figure 9 for the distribution of PTSD severity scores. To determine 
whether the scores on this measure followed the expected factor structure, scores for each 
question were entered into a confirmatory factor analysis with each symptom loading on the 
appropriate symptom cluster latent factor and all of the symptom cluster latent factors loading 
onto a total PTSD score latent factor.   
The model for the confirmatory factor analysis had a TLI of .834, a SRMR of .068, a CFI of 
.855, and a RMSEA of .106. Although the SRMR suggests that the model is an adequate fit for 
the data, the other measures suggest that this model should not be considered a good fit for the 
data. This means that the factor structure of PTSD symptoms in this sample only loosely fits the 
factor structure of PTSD in the DSM-5. Therefore, while scores on the PTSD questionnaires 
were used in subsequent analyses, results from these analyses should be considered in the 
context of a less than adequate model fit. See Table 3 for the standardized factor loadings for 
each question on the PCL-5. As is evident from this table, the factor loadings for reexperiencing, 
avoidance, and alterations in mood and cognition were very high. However, some of the factor 
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loadings for increased arousal were lower, which may have contributed to the failure of the 
model to adequately fit the data in this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Distribution of PTSD Severity Scores. The suggested cut-off score for probable PTSD 
is 33, represented by the dotted line (National Center for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder).  
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Table 3. Factor loadings for the PCL-5 
    
  p 
Standardized 
Loading 
Reexperiencing   
 Q1   
 Q2 <.001 0.65 
 Q3 <.001 0.66 
 Q4 <.001 0.82 
 Q5 <.001 0.82 
    
Avoidance   
 Q6   
 Q7 <.001 0.84 
    
Alterations in Cognition and Mood   
 Q8   
 Q9 <.001 0.86 
 Q10 <.001 0.80 
 Q11 <.001 0.86 
 Q12 <.001 0.75 
 Q13 <.001 0.79 
 Q14 <.001 0.73 
    
Increased Arousal   
 Q15   
 Q16 <.001 0.53 
 Q17 <.001 0.57 
 Q18 <.001 0.61 
 Q19 <.001 0.87 
 Q20 <.001 0.73 
    
PTSD   
 Reexperiencing   
 Avoidance <.001 0.91 
 Alterations in Cognition and Mood <.001 0.88 
  Increased Arousal <.001 0.82 
 
3.1.2 Crystallized and Fluid Intelligence Measures 
Scores on the Synonym Vocabulary, Antonym Vocabulary, and Information tasks were 
summed to generate a total score for each task. See Table 4 for descriptive statistics for these 
tasks. 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics             
 Mean  SD  Min  Max 
Crystallized        
   Synonym 6.51  2.21  1.00  10.00 
   Antonym 6.34  2.11  1.00  10.00 
   Information 17.35  3.46  5.00  23.00 
Fluid        
   Letter Sets 11.40  2.29  3.50  15.00 
   Paper Folding 12.95  3.57  1.00   
   Raven's 11.58  2.62  3.00  18.00 
Prediction Battery        
   PLAT 1.15  0.40  0.15  2.15 
   VW 0.00  0.04  -0.11  0.11 
   Weather 0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.01 
   Iowa Gambling 63.82  10.91  32.00  80.00 
Processing Speed 509.00*  243.28  230.00  2703.00 
PTSD 10.65  13.1  0.00  60.00 
Note: PLAT = Predictive Looking at Action Task; VW = Visual World 
*The median for the processing speed measure. 
 
Scores on the Raven’s Progressive Matrices task were also summed to generate a total score 
for each participant. For the Letter Sets and Paper Folding tasks, participants received one point 
for every correct response and lost .25 points for every incorrect response. An error in the 
Experiment Builder code for the Letter Sets and Paper Folding tasks caused the program to skip 
through items and report an extremely short reaction time of less than 100 ms. This affected 
twenty participants for the Letter Sets task (one participant was missing three items, eight 
participants were missing two items, and eleven participants were missing one item), and twenty 
participants for the Paper Folding task (one participant was missing five items, three participants 
were missing four items, one participant was missing three items, eight participants were missing 
two items, and seven participants were missing one item). Missing responses for each task were 
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imputed using the mean score for the non-missing responses1. The split-half reliability for the 
Letter Sets task was 0.44 and the split-half reliability for the Paper Folding task was 0.65.  The 
low split half reliability for these tasks are quite low, which may be due, in part, to the small 
number of items for each task (15 for the Letter Sets task and 20 for the Paper Folding task). See 
Table 4 for descriptive statistics for these tasks. 
3.1.3 Prediction Battery 
For the PLAT, three growth curve models were tested: 1) a model that only allowed the 
intercept to vary by subject, 2) a model that allowed the intercept and linear slope to vary by 
subject, and 3) a model that allowed the intercept and both the linear and quadratic slopes to vary 
by subject. A comparison of these models suggested that the model with random intercepts and 
linear and quadratic slopes provided the best fit for the data (χ2 (3) = 970.26, p < .001). For this 
model, the fixed linear (t = -26.49, p < .001) and quadratic (t = 38.23, p < .001) effects of time 
bin were significant.  In addition, the random intercept for movie had a variance of 0.09 (SD = 
.29), and the residual variance was 0.22 (SD = .46). The random intercept for subject had a 
variance of 0.11 (SD = .34), the random linear slope for subject had a variance of .02 (SD = .16), 
and the random quadratic slope for subject had a variance of .17 (SD = .41). The intercept and 
random linear slope were correlated with r = -0.74, the intercept and quadratic random slope 
were correlated with r = 0.89, and the linear and quadratic random slopes were correlated with r 
                                                
1 Multiple imputation was not performed because participants were allowed to skip items, which 
likely resulted in non-random missing data. To ensure that imputing using the mean did not 
significantly affect the results, a follow-up analysis was performed in which the missing data 
were not imputed, and instead were treated as missing. All of the models were then tested using 
the resulting data. The pattern of results was identical to that reported below.   
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= -0.97. Because the linear and quadratic random slopes were so highly correlated, only the 
quadratic random slope was used as an individual difference measure in later analyses. A split 
half reliability test found that this individual difference measure had adequate reliability (r = 
0.79, p < .001). (See Figure 10 for subject level data for this task and Table 4 for descriptive 
statistics for this task.)  
 
Figure 10. Participant level data for the PLAT. Each colored line represents one participant’s 
performance on this task. The x-axis represents the 3000 ms before contact for the interest areas, 
divided into 100 ms bins. The y-axis represents the number of milliseconds participants spent 
looking in the interest areas during each 100 ms bin.  
 
For the visual world task, two sentences were dropped from further analysis because they 
engendered very low predictive looking across participants, with participants only looking at the 
  53 
target item 3% or 4% of the time during the predictive sentences. Then, the data from the 
remaining 22 items were entered into a mixed-effects model with the time spent looking at the 
target in the predictive sentences as the dependent variable and the time spent looking at the 
target in the unpredictive sentences as the independent variable. Only the intercept was allowed 
to vary by subject. The residuals from this model represented the time spent looking at the target 
item, controlling for the saliency of the item. The residuals for each item were averaged for each 
participant to get a predictive looking measure. Split-half reliability for the predictive looking 
measure was .53, and although this split-half reliability was lower than what is typically 
preferred, other scoring methods produced even lower reliability. (See Table 4 for descriptive 
statistics for the predictive looking measure for this task.) This predictive looking measure was 
entered into the structural equation models as the individual differences measure for the visual 
world task. 
In addition, to ensure that the results in this study replicated results from other studies 
that have used the visual world paradigm, predictive looking results for the predictive and 
unpredictive sentences were plotted in Figure 11. It is evident from this figure that participants 
generally spent more time looking at the target object when the verb was predictive of only the 
target object compared to sentences in which the verb could reference all of the objects in the 
display. These results replicate those found in other studies of the visual world paradigm (e.g., 
Altmann and Kamide, 1999). 
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Figure 11. Predictive looking results for the visual world task. The time from verb onset to noun 
onset was warped into 28 bins with varying numbers of milliseconds in each bin, and these 28 
bins are on the x-axis. The y-axis represents the cumulative proportion of time participants spent 
looking at the target object. The shaded regions around each line represent the 95% confidence 
intervals. 
 For the weather prediction task, the results from the logistic growth curve model 
suggested that the fixed effect of the logistic slope was significant (z = 8.001, p < .001). In 
addition, the random intercept had a variance of 0.25 (SD = .50), and the random logistic slope 
had a variance of .05 (SD = .22). The random logistic slope was used as the individual 
differences measure in subsequent analyses. (See Figure 12 for the logistic curves fit for each 
participant and Table 4 for descriptive statistics for this task.) 
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Figure 12. Participant level logistic general linear model results for the weather prediction task. 
Each colored line in this figure represents the best-fit logistic slope for an individual participant. 
The black line represents the overall model estimate for the logistic slope.  
 
For the Iowa gambling task, responses were scored as correct if the participant chose 
from one of the decks that resulted in a higher long-term payout (decks C or D). A final score for 
this task was calculated by summing the total number of correct responses over the one hundred 
trials of this task. (See Table 4 for descriptive statistics for this task.) 
3.1.4 Processing Speed 
First, response times for visual world, weather prediction, synonym vocabulary, and 
antonym vocabulary tasks were calculated for each participant using the mean response time 
across items. For the weather prediction tasks, only response times for the last 50 trials of the 
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task that also only had one card presented were used for the processing speed measure. However, 
most of the correlations were very low (see Table 5). To ensure that the low correlations were 
not due to very long response times for some trials, the median response time and the 30th 
percentile response time was calculated for each item and then averaged within participants to 
obtain a potential processing speed measure. However, a similar pattern of correlations emerged 
from these analyses as well (see Table 6). Therefore, the median response time for the visual 
world task was used as a measure of processing speed for future analyses, as this seemed, a 
priori, to be the best measure of processing speed available from the tasks included in this study. 
(See Table 4 for descriptive statistics for this measure of processing speed.) 
Table 5: Correlations of Means for Processing Speed Tasks 
  
  VW Weather Synonym Antonym 
VW 1.00 0.04 -0.10 -0.08 
Weather 0.04 1.00 0.15 0.17 
Syonym -0.10 0.15 1.00 0.76 
Antonym -0.08 0.17 0.76 1.00 
Note: VW = Visual World Task  
 
Table 6: Correlations of Medians and 30th Percentiles* 
  
 VW Weather Synonym Antonym 
VW 1.00/1.00 0.11/0.12 0.13/0.12 0.08/0.11 
Weather 0.11/0.12 1.00/1.00 0.15/0.18 0.16/0.25 
Synonym 0.13/0.12 0.15/0.18 1.00/1.00 0.79/0.75 
Antonym 0.08/0.11 0.16/0.25 0.79/0.75 1.00/1.00 
*Number before the slash is the correlation of the medians; Number after 
the slash is the correlation of the 30th percentiles 
Note: VW = Visual World Task  
 
3.1.5 Summary of Individual Differences Measures 
 For the crystallized and fluid intelligence tasks, final score on these measures were entered 
into the structural equation models as the individual differences measure. For the PLAT, the 
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quadratic random slopes representing the time each participant spent looking at the target object 
over the three seconds before contact were used as the individual differences measure in the 
structural equation models. For the visual world task, the individual differences measure was the 
average time each participant spent looking at the target objects, controlling for the saliency of 
the objects. The individual differences measure for the weather prediction task was the random 
logistic slope representing subject level growth in performance over the trials of the task. For the 
Iowa gambling task, the individual differences measure was the total number of correct 
responses over all trials of the task. Finally, for the models that included PTSD severity score, 
total PTSD severity was used as the individual differences measure. 
3.2 Modeling 
 First, a confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to determine whether responses on 
the synonym, antonym, and Information tasks loaded onto a crystallized intelligence latent factor 
and whether responses on the Raven’s Progressive Matrices, letter sets, and paper folding tasks 
loaded onto a fluid intelligence latent factor. This model also included a term for the correlation 
of the crystallized and fluid latent factors. A second model in which the crystallized and fluid 
latent factors loaded onto a general intelligence latent factor (g) was also tested. 
The same model fit indices as discussed above were used to determine whether these 
models provided a good fit for the data. For the model without the general intelligence latent 
factor, the TLI was .984, the SRMR was .035, the CFI was .991, and the RMSEA was .037. The 
Swain correction was then applied to correct for potential bias of model fit estimators. Using this 
correction, the TLI was .98, the CFI was .99, and the RMSEA was .036. All of these measures 
suggest that the model provided a good fit for the data. Figure 13 displays the factor weights for 
this model. However, the correlation between the crystallized and fluid latent factors was 0.09, 
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suggesting that these factors would not load onto a single general intelligence latent factor.  
Therefore, the second model that included a single general intelligence latent factor was not 
tested, and a latent factor for overall cognitive functioning was not included in any of the 
following models. 
 
Figure 13. Results of the confirmatory factor analysis for the general intelligence measures. Ant 
= Antonym Vocabulary task; Syn = Synonym Vocabulary task; Inf = Information task; PpF = 
Paper Folding task; LtS = Letter Sets task; Rvn = Raven’s Progressive Matrices; Crys = 
crystallized intelligence latent factor; Fld = fluid intelligence latent factor. 
 
 The correlations among the four prediction tasks were very low, with none of the 
correlations above .11. (See Table 7 for the correlations among these tasks.) Although it was 
therefore unlikely that the four tasks would load onto a single latent factor, a confirmatory factor 
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analysis was performed. Although the model converged, the fit indices suggested that this model 
was misspecified. For this model, the CFI was 1.00, the TLI was -14.58, the RMSEA was 0.00, 
and the SRMR was .01. Inspecting the loadings onto the latent factor revealed that none of the 
prediction tasks significantly loaded onto the latent variable, which was unsurprising given the 
low correlations among the tasks.    
Table 7: Correlations among the prediction tasks 
  
 PLAT VW Weather IGT 
PLAT 1.00 0.07 0.07 0.10 
VW 0.07 1.00 0.02 0.11 
Weather 0.07 0.02 1.00 0.01 
IGT 0.10 0.11 0.01 1.00 
Note: PLAT = Predictive Looking at Action Task; VW = Visual World 
Task 
 
 Because the prediction tasks did not load onto a single latent factor, the planned structural 
equation models could not be tested. Therefore, the model in Figure 14 was tested to determine 
whether fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, and processing speed predicted performance 
on each of the individual prediction tasks. The simple correlations among these measures are 
given in Table 8. For this model, the TLI was .95, the SRMR was .04, the CFI was .97, and the 
RMSEA was .04. After applying the Swain correction, the TLI was .95, the CFI was .97, and the 
RMSEA was .04. These fit indices suggest that this model provided a good fit for the data. For 
this model, the standardized regression coefficient for the relationship between crystallized 
intelligence and the PLAT was negative and significant (-0.17, p = .02), which was quite 
surprising given that knowledge of what tends to happen in a given situation would be expected 
to improve performance on the PLAT. The standardized regression coefficient for the 
relationship between fluid intelligence and the weather prediction task was significant (0.18, p = 
.02). Furthermore, the standardized regression coefficients for the relationships between the Iowa 
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gambling Task and crystallized intelligence (0.17, p = .03) and fluid intelligence (.16, p = .04) 
were significant. Finally, the relationship between processing speed and the PLAT (-.13, p = 
.047) was significant. All of the other regression coefficients were not significant. (See Figure 14 
for the path diagram with all of the standardized estimates.)  
Table 8. Simple correlations between the prediction tasks and the crystallized and fluid 
intelligence tasks. 
  Antonym Synonym Information Paper Fold.  Letter Sets  Ravens 
PLAT -0.12 -0.12 -0.02 0.04 0.00 0.06 
Visual World -0.08 -0.02 0.05 0.08 0.11 -0.05 
Weather Pred. -0.03 0.06 -0.03 0.16 0.08 0.11 
Iowa Gambling 0.13 0.18 0.20 0.08 0.08 0.20 
 
 
Figure 14. Path diagram. PLA = Predictive Looking at Action Task, VW = Visual World task, 
Wth = Weather Prediction, IGT = Iowa Gambling Task, Cry = Crystallized Intelligence, Fld = 
Fluid Intelligence, Ant = Antonym Vocabulary, Syn = Synonym Vocabulary, Inf = Information, 
PpF = Paper Folding, LtS = Letter Sets, Rvn = Raven’s Progressive Matrices, PrS = Processing 
Speed. The weights of the arrows represent the magnitude of the path coefficients. A star next to 
a regression coefficient indicates a significant beta weight. 
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The final model included PTSD symptom severity as a predictor of performance on the 
crystallized and fluid intelligence latent factors as well as each of the four prediction tasks. For 
this model, the TLI was .95, the SRMR was .04, the CFI was .97, and the RMSEA was .03. After 
applying the Swain correction, the TLI was .96, the CFI was .98, and the RMSEA was .03. These 
fit indices suggest that this model also provides a good fit for the data. However, none of the 
regression coefficients for the relationships between PTSD symptom severity and the other tasks 
and latent variables were significant (PLAT: 0.02, p = .73; VW: -0.02, p = .76; Weather: -0.08, p 
= .24; IGT: -0.04, p = .50; Fluid: -0.01, p =. 91; Crystallized: -0.04, p = .61), suggesting that 
PTSD symptom severity was not related to performance on the other tasks included in this study. 
(See Figure 15 for the path diagram with all of the standardized estimates.) 
 
 
Figure 15. Path diagram for the model that included PTSD as a predictor of performance on the 
tasks. PLA = Predictive Looking at Action Task, VW = Visual World task, Wth = Weather 
Prediction, IGT = Iowa Gambling Task, Cry = Crystallized Intelligence, Fld = Fluid Intelligence, 
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Ant = Antonym Vocabulary, Syn = Synonym Vocabªulary, Inf = Information, PTS = PTSD, PpF 
= Paper Folding, LtS = Letter Sets, Rvn = Raven’s Progressive Matrices; PrS = Processing 
Speed. The weights of the arrows represent the magnitude of the path coefficients. 
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Chapter 4: Discussion 
4.1 No Evidence for a Prediction Construct 
The current study was the first to directly investigate the question of whether there is a 
single higher-order integratory prediction mechanism in the brain, and the data provide evidence 
against the existence of such a mechanism. Specifically, if there were a higher order integratory 
prediction mechanism, performance on tasks that require prediction formation should have been 
correlated, regardless of the task modality. However, in the current study, the PLAT, visual 
world, weather prediction, and Iowa gambling tasks did not load onto a single latent factor, and 
the correlations among these tasks were uniformly extremely low. This is in contrast with current 
theories including the predictive coding theory (Friston, 2005) and Event Segmentation Theory 
(Zacks, Speer, Swallow, Braver, & Reynolds, 2007), which both imply the existence of a higher-
order integratory prediction mechanism. The results of the current study also differ from the 
implications of previous neurophysiological and neuroimaging studies that found that similar 
signals are sent from lower-order to higher-order brain areas and vice versa in many systems in 
the brain (e.g, Tap & Bar, 2005; Tanaka et al, 2004; Dikker & Pylkkänen, 2003).  
On the other hand, in concert with the results of the current study, neurophysiological data 
provide evidence against an integratory prediction mechanism, as there are many different 
prediction error signals in the brain (e.g., ERN, MMN, P300, N400, P600) rather than a single 
error signal used by all brain systems that is sent to an integrative prediction mechanism. In 
addition, in two of the very few studies that investigated performance on the weather prediction 
and Iowa gambling tasks in the same participants, performance across these tasks was not as 
similar as expected. For example, in a study of HIV positive participants with a history of 
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substance dependence, there was no significant relationship between the weather prediction task 
and the Iowa gambling task (Gonzales, Wardle, Jacobus, Vassileva, & Martin-Thormeyer, 2010). 
Similarly, in a study investigating the effects of antipsychotic medications in patients with 
schizophrenia, performance on the weather prediction task did not track performance on the Iowa 
gambling task (Wasserman, Barry, Bradford, Delva, & Beninger, 2012). Although neither of 
these previous studies included a control group of healthy adults, they do provide some 
converging evidence in for the lack of correlations among the four prediction tasks in the current 
study. The results of the current study therefore provide initial evidence against an integrative 
prediction mechanism and suggest that current theories involving prediction may need further 
examination. 
If, as the results of the current study suggest, there is no higher-order integrative prediction 
mechanism that allows for performance on prediction tasks that require multiple modalities, how 
might people successfully perform these tasks? It is possible that when people engage in 
prediction within a particular modality, a network of regions, including regions that are specific 
to the primary task modality, is activated. If the task requires the integration of multiple sensory 
modalities, the network of regions that is activated may simply include the additional regions 
necessary for the second modality. While some of these areas would likely overlap, it could be 
the activity in the separate areas that drives behavioral performance on the tasks. For example, 
the Iowa gambling task, which requires visual processing, has been found to activate the 
occipital cortex, medial frontal gyrus, and orbitofrontal cortex, among other areas, when 
participants chose a risky deck compared to a safe deck (Lawrence, Jollant, O’Daly, Zelaya, and 
Phillips, 2009). In addition to requiring predictions within the visual modality, the Iowa 
Gambling task also involves reward processing, as participants obtain rewards and losses 
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throughout the task. Tasks involving reward prediction often activate the striatum and 
orbitofrontal cortex (e.g., Tanaka et al, 2004; Ernst et al., 2004). In fact, (Lawrence, Jollant, 
O’Daly, Zelaya, and Phillips, 2009) found activation in the orbitofrontal cortex when participants 
completed the Iowa gambling task compared to a control task in which participants were told 
which choices to make. It is therefore possible that the activation patterns seen when participants 
complete the Iowa gambling task are due to the activation of two separate brain networks—a 
visual prediction network and a reward prediction network—that operate in parallel and therefore 
appear to be a single activated network. Thus, overall performance on the Iowa gambling task 
would depend on prediction ability in the two separate modalities, and performance might very 
well not be correlated with a different task that requires predictions in a different modality (e.g., 
auditory predictions) which might activate yet another overlapping but different brain network. 
This hypothesis of overlapping but separate brain networks that are activated by the distinct 
predictive processing modalities involved in each task could explain the lack of correlations 
among the prediction tasks included in the current study. For example, if a particular participant 
tends to be better at making visual predictions than reward predictions, this participant might 
obtain a higher score on the PLAT, which is primarily a visual task, than on the Iowa gambling 
task, which also involves a reward prediction component. If participants have strengths and 
weaknesses that drive performance differently on each task, the low correlations among the tasks 
in the current study would be expected. 
In addition to differences in the prediction modalities required by each task in the current 
study, method variance across the tasks may provide a less interesting source for the lack of 
correlations among the tasks, as individual differences in abilities other than prediction could 
have overshadowed prediction ability as a driver of performance. For example, the weather 
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prediction task may have required the ability to use spatial information while performing the 
task, as the spatial configuration of the stimuli predicted the correct response. Evidence from 
fMRI studies of probabilistic classification tasks provide support for this possibility. For 
example, an fMRI study of a probabilistic classification task found activation in the parietal 
cortex, an area that is often implicated in tasks involving spatial processing, during the time that 
participants were likely making predictions about the category of the stimulus (Aron et al., 
2004). In fact, a second fMRI study of a different probabilistic classification task also found 
activation in the parietal lobe when participants experienced uncertainty about their response 
(Huettel, Song, & McCarthy, 2005). If some participants were better at learning spatial 
information, these participants may have performed better on this task regardless of their ability 
to make predictions, which would lower overall correlations among the tasks.  
Similarly, each of the other tasks also includes components, distinct from prediction, which 
could drive performance. For example, Li, Lu, D’Argembeau, Ng, and Bechara (2010) suggest 
that the Iowa gambling task requires the processing of risk, finding that when people perform the 
task, the amygdala signals the presence of risk to the orbito-frontal/venteromedial prefrontal 
cortex. Though risk evaluation likely plays a role in making predictions in the Iowa gambling 
task, the other tasks in the current study did not heavily involve the evaluation of risk, which 
could explain the low correlations between this task and the other prediction tasks.  
 The visual world task very clearly involves a language processing component that is not 
relevant for any of the other tasks in the current study. Therefore, if participants varied in their 
ability to process language information, this may have masked the effect of individual 
differences in prediction ability on performance of the visual world task. An imaging study on a 
task that is conceptually similar to the visual world paradigm, in which participants listened to 
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sentences and chose which of three or four line drawings in a array best represented the content 
of the sentences, provides evidence that language comprehension is necessary for successful 
performance on the task (Dronkers, Wilkins, Van Valin, Redfern, & Jaeger, 2004). The authors 
found that lesions in the posterior middle temporal gyrus and anterior superior temporal gyrus, 
which are areas involved in language comprehension, strongly affected performance on the task. 
Therefore, it is possible that performance on the visual world task did not correlate with 
performance on the other tasks because difference in language processing dominated prediction 
ability in driving individual differences on this task.  
Finally, successful performance on the PLAT requires participants to quickly process human 
action, an ability that was not required by any of the other tasks. Imaging studies have found 
evidence that when participants watch another person perform a task, the participants create a 
motor program for completing a task that is very similar to the motor program participants use 
when performing the task themselves (e.g., Flanagan & Johansson, 2003, but see Caramazza, 
Anzellotti, Strnad, & Lingnau, 2014 for an evaluation of this and another potential mechanism). 
If individual differences in people’s ability to create a motor program dominated individual 
differences in prediction ability, low correlations between performance on the PLAT and the 
other prediction tasks might be expected. Overall, given that each of the four prediction tasks 
included in this study likely involve different mechanism (e.g., spatial processing, risk 
processing, language processing, and motor planning), in addition to prediction, individual 
differences in each of these other abilities may have resulted in the lack of correlations among 
the tasks observed in the current study. 
There is, however, another possible explanation for the finding in the current study: Perhaps 
the tasks used in the current study did not require the intervention of an integrator or arbiter 
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because information from various sensory modalities did not conflict in these tasks. Maybe an 
integratory process only becomes active, and therefore only drives performance, when conflict 
resolution is necessary. For example, on the visual world task, both the visual information 
participants saw and the auditory information participants heard drove eye movements to the 
same object. There were no trials in which the auditory information directed eye movements to 
one object but visual information directed eye movements to a different object. If the tasks did 
not, in fact, require conflict resolution, the conclusion that there is no higher order prediction 
mechanism that drives performance on various types of prediction tasks is likely generally true, 
but there may also be a separate mechanism that arbitrates conflict across many types of tasks. In 
fact, there is suggestion in the literature that the anterior cingulate cortex may play a conflict 
resolution role across a wide variety of tasks (e.g., Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter), although there is 
also evidence that conflict resolution does not adequately describe the full function of the 
anterior cingulate cortex (e.g., Brown and Braver, 2005).  
In addition, it is possible that there is a higher-order prediction mechanism that integrates 
information from various modalities, but that people, or at least the participants in the current 
study, do not differ in their ability to integrate information in order to make predictions. This 
potential lack of individual differences could result in low correlations among the tasks, because 
individual differences are necessary in order to find correlations. The fact that participants had a 
wide range of scores on each of the individual tasks used in this study at least suggests that there 
were individual differences on the tasks, but this does not necessarily mean that people differed 
in their ability to combine the information they gained from different modalities and use this 
integrated information to make predictions. However, it would likely be difficult to determine 
whether there are individual differences in the ability to integrate information from various 
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modalities and make predictions based on this combined information. For example, it is difficult 
to find a study design that would be able to differentiate between true integration of information 
from multiple sensory modalities versus separate representations of information from each 
modality that are nevertheless all used to guide behavior. Imaging studies could potentially 
identify networks that are activated by tasks that require integration of information, and these 
networks could be compared to the networks activated by tasks that only require the use of a 
single modality. If a multi-modality task requires brain regions that are not activated by separate 
tasks that require each of the modalities included in the multi-modality task, this would provide 
some evidence that performance on multi-modality tasks requires more than just the concurrent 
activation of networks specialized for the various modalities. On the other hand, it seems 
unlikely that participants would display such high variability on all of the individual tasks and no 
variability on prediction integration. Furthermore, it seems likely that individual differences in 
prediction integration (if such integration occurs) would exist, given that so many other higher 
cognitive functions, including working memory, attention, and executive function, do show 
individual differences. Therefore, the results of this study are more consistent with the absence of 
a higher-order integratory mechanism than with an integratory process that does not vary across 
individuals. 
4.2 Measures of General Intelligence Predict Performance on Some Prediction Tasks 
Although the prediction tasks did not load onto a single latent factor, the measures of general 
intelligence did correlate with performance on some of the prediction tasks. In particular, higher 
crystallized intelligence predicted worse performance on the PLAT and better performance on 
the Iowa gambling task. In addition, higher fluid intelligence predicted better performance on the 
weather prediction task and the Iowa gambling task. Finally, there was a negative relationship 
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between performance on the PLAT and processing speed. Although hypotheses about these 
relationships are post-hoc, the positive relationships between fluid intelligence and performance 
on the weather prediction and Iowa gambling tasks seem reasonable, as the ability to process 
new information and use that new information to complete tasks does seem related to fluid 
intelligence. In fact, previous research on the Iowa gambling task has found some support for the 
relationship between this task and general intelligence (e.g., Monterosso, Ehrman, Napier, 
O’Brien, & Childress, 2001), though other studies have found no relationship between 
performance on this task and IQ (e.g., Bechara et al., 2001; Brand, Recknor, Grabenhorst, & 
Bechara, 2007). In addition, the negative relationship between performance on the PLAT and 
processing speed (where a smaller processing speed score means faster responses) suggests that 
people who have faster processing speeds perform better on the PLAT, potentially because they 
are faster at predicting which object the actor is about to touch.  
On the other hand, the positive relationship between the Iowa gambling task and crystallized 
intelligence was surprising because the ability to learn from new information, more than prior 
knowledge, would be expected to drive performance on this task. However, results from a 
previous study provide support for the current finding of the relationship between crystallized 
intelligence and performance on the Iowa gambling task: in a study of undergraduate students, 
participants who scored higher on the vocabulary measure also performed better on the Iowa 
gambling task (Damaree, Burns, & DeDonno, 2010. One potential explanation for the positive 
relationship is that participants with higher crystallized intelligence may have had more prior 
experience with the Iowa gambling task than participants with lower crystallized intelligence. 
For example, most of the participants in the current study were undergraduate students, and 
students who were further along in their education may both have had higher crystallized 
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intelligence and have taken more psychology classes in which they were exposed to the Iowa 
gambling task. Participants were not debriefed about their prior experience with the tasks, so it is 
not possible to determine whether prior experience drove the relationship.  Similarly, the 
negative relationship between crystallized intelligence and performance on the PLAT was 
unexpected. Performance on the PLAT would be expected to be driven, at least in part, by 
schemas that include information about what typically happens in similar situations. Therefore, 
more prior knowledge about situations and people’s typical behavior in given environments 
would be expected to improve, rather than impair, performance. However, the negative 
relationship between crystallized intelligence and the PLAT suggests that either prior schemas 
are not related to crystallized intelligence or that schemas are less important for successful 
performance on the PLAT than would be expected. Overall, replications are necessary to 
determine whether the relationships among the general intelligence constructs and the prediction 
tasks represent the true states of the relationships. 
4.3 Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Did Not Predict Performance on Other Tasks 
Although the model in Figure 15 that included PTSD as a predictor of the prediction tasks 
did provide a good fit for the data, PTSD severity did not predict performance on the general 
intelligence constructs or the prediction tasks. One possibility for the lack of significant 
relationships is that most of the participants in this study reported low levels of PTSD severity, 
with only a small number of participants in the middle to high range of severity, as can be seen in 
Figure 9. In fact, only 19 participants were above the current recommended cut-point of 33 on 
this measure. Therefore, there may not have been enough variability to see individual differences 
in performance on the other tasks based on PTSD severity scores. It is also possible that 
prediction ability is not impaired in PTSD. There have not been any studies investigating 
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performance on the visual world task, the Iowa gambling task, or the weather prediction task in 
people with PTSD, however, a recent study in our laboratory found that people with clinical 
levels of PTSD performed worse than controls on the PLAT (Eisenberg, Zacks, Rodebaugh, & 
Flores, in prep). Additional studies on the relationship between PTSD and various prediction 
tasks are necessary to determine whether the restricted range of PTSD severity scores in this 
study drove the lack of relationship between PTSD symptom severity and the prediction tasks.  
4.4 Impact of Findings on Current Theories  
4.4.1 Predictive Coding Model 
As discussed in the introduction, the predictive coding model (Friston, 2005) suggests that 
predictions occur in a hierarchical fashion, with higher-order areas using past experience to make 
predictions and then sending those predictions to lower order areas. These lower order areas 
compare the predictions to sensory information from the environment. When there is a mismatch 
between the sensory information and the predictions, the lower-order areas send prediction error 
signals to the higher-order areas, which then either update their predictions or change sampling 
behavior so that incoming sensory information matches their predictions. Most of the research on 
this theory has studied individual systems, but Adams, Friston, and Bastos (2015) argue that 
because prediction errors can lead to both sensory and motor changes, the sensory and motor 
systems should be considered “a single active inference machine” (p. 100). This is a strong 
statement in support of a unified prediction mechanism in the brain, and Adams, Friston, and 
Bastos support this statement with findings that the laminar, topographic, and physiological 
characteristics of the sensory and motor cortices are quite similar.  
 However, given the results of the current study, it does not seem likely that Adams, Friston, 
and Bastos (2015) are correct about the existence of a single active inference machine, despite 
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the structural similarities of the systems. If all of the sensory and motor areas truly did act as a 
single unified system, performance on the tasks included in the current study, which all required 
activation of various sensory and motor areas, should have been correlated. Perhaps, instead of a 
unified inference machine, each system separately engages in feed-forward and feedback signals 
that allow for prediction within individual modalities. The structural similarities of the various 
cortical areas that Adams, Friston, and Bastos (2015) use to support their proposition of a unified 
inference machine may have developed as a parsimonious solution to developing complex 
cortical structures, but their structural similarities do not necessitate that all of the individual 
areas cohere into a unified prediction mechanism. Thus, while the current study does not provide 
evidence against the entirety of the predictive coding model of the human brain, the results 
reported here do suggest that a single unified prediction mechanism does not operate in the 
human brain.  
4.4.2 Event Segmentation Theory 
 Event Segmentation Theory (EST; Zacks, Speer, Swallow, Braver, & Reynolds, 2007) 
provides a model of how people comprehend ongoing, dynamic activity. It proposes that people 
use their existing knowledge about typical situations (event schema) to create a representation of 
the current situation, and use this event model along with incoming sensory information to make 
predictions about what is going to happen next. When mismatches between predictions and 
incoming sensory information develop, the event model is updated to better represent the current 
situation. People perceive boundaries between events when this event model updating occurs 
(Zacks, Speer, Swallow, Braver, & Reynolds, 2007), and better perception of these event 
boundaries has been linked to increased memory for the events (Zacks, Speer, Vettel, & Jacoby, 
2006). 
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 EST postulates that a single event model that encompasses modalities is used to generate 
predictions about what will happen next. Although in any given situation, an event model could 
include information from only a single sensory modality, it should also be able to incorporate 
information from multiple modalities, as it is rare in everyday life for only a single modality to 
be relevant. For example, while watching an actor complete an everyday activity, an observer’s 
event model would likely include visual information about the current activity, auditory 
information based on experience with the typical sounds generated by the activity, and motor 
information that would include the motor sequences necessary to generate a similar action. 
Therefore, EST proposes that multi-modality event models should be represented in some way in 
the brain, and that these event models should then be used to generate predictions about the 
future.  
 Most research on EST has studied event comprehension and prediction by having 
participants watch movies of everyday activities or read narratives about people engaging in 
activities, and it is possible that EST is limited to only these modalities. However, Zacks, Speer, 
Swallow, Braver, & Reynolds (2007) suggest that people use event models as a basis for 
prediction in every modality. For example, in the context of the current study, it might be 
possible to explain performance on the weather prediction task using EST: When people start the 
weather prediction task, they begin to learn the relationships between the geometric patterns on 
the cards and the outcome of the trial. Over time, they begin to create an event model that 
represents their current knowledge of these relationships. They make predictions about whether 
there will be rain or sun on the basis of this developing event model, and when their predictions 
are inaccurate, they update their event model to include the new information. Similar processes 
likely occur as people perform the Iowa gambling task and the visual world task. The PLAT, 
  75 
though a novel task, is most similar to previous studies that have found evidence for EST. One 
study using this task found that healthy adult participants took longer to look at the target object 
when contact occurred around event boundaries than when contact occurred within an event 
(Eisenberg & Zacks, in prep), suggesting that predictions failed more often at event boundaries 
than within events. Performance on the PLAT, therefore, likely relies on the formation of event 
models that are updated at times of high prediction error.  
 If an integrated event model that is used to drive predictions does exist, one would expect 
that performance on the prediction tasks included in the current study would be correlated, as 
performance on all of these tasks would be based, at least in part, on the ability to form accurate 
event models; people who are better at forming event models should perform better on all of the 
tasks, and people who are worse at forming event models should perform more poorly. However, 
the low correlations among the four prediction tasks included in this study provide evidence 
against the existence of such an event model. This leaves open four possibilities: (1) multi-modal 
event models exist, but people do not vary in their ability to use event models to make 
predictions, (2) event models are only used when people are processing naturalistic activity, (3) 
event models consist of multiple separate representations from each of the separate sensory and 
motor systems, and (4) multi-modal event models exist, but individual differences are driven by 
modality specific prediction mechanisms that operate upstream of the event models. 
First, it is possible that a unified event model does exist but people do not vary in their 
ability to use such an event model to make predictions. This possibility is very similar to the 
supposition, mentioned earlier, that people do not vary in their ability to integrate information in 
order to make predictions. Yet, as previously discussed, there was adequate variability across 
subjects on all of the tasks used in the current study. In particular, participants varied in their 
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ability to perform the PLAT, and performance on this task has previously been found to track the 
locations of event boundaries (Eisenberg and Zacks, in prep). Of the tasks included in the current 
study, the PLAT should most strongly involve the creation of event models, suggesting that 
participants were not identical in their ability to use event models to make predictions. Therefore, 
low variability cannot explain the results of the current study or preserve the concept of a unified 
event model.  
Another possibility is that event models are limited to the domain of comprehending 
naturalistic activity. In this case, performance on tasks that all involve the comprehension of 
naturalistic activity should be correlated, even if performance relies on different sensory 
modalities. For example, performance on the PLAT should be correlated with performance on 
tasks in which participants listen to narratives of everyday activities (where prediction could be 
measured through predictive looking at arrays of images representing characters or objects that 
will soon be mentioned in the narrative) and on tasks in which participants read narratives of 
everyday activities (where prediction could be measured by pausing reading and asking 
participants to make explicit predictions about what will happen next). Although there have not 
been studies that test prediction performance on these different types of event comprehension 
tasks, the results of the current study and the principles of parsimony suggest that performance 
would not be correlated across different types of event comprehension tasks. Specifically, if 
unitary event models did exist, performance on all of the tasks used in this study should have 
relied on such an integrative event model, as it is unlikely that an integrative event model would 
be created solely during event comprehension tasks (e.g., the PLAT). There seems no reason for 
integrative event models to be used solely for tasks that involve the comprehension of 
naturalistic activities, when a similar mechanism could be used for many other types of tasks. In 
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fact, it is arguably the case that all of the tasks included in the current study were everyday 
events for the participants in the study, and therefore should have relied on integrative event 
models.  Participants completed the tasks in and among all of the other daily activities in which 
they participated. Therefore, participants should have treated the tasks in the study as events, 
created unified event models of their perceptions of each activity, and then used these unified 
event models to make predictions that integrated information across modalities. In fact, it is very 
likely that if other people were asked to watch a movie that included a period of time in which an 
actor performed exactly the same tasks that were included in the present study, viewers would 
identify event boundaries at the beginning and completion of each task. Consequently, it seems 
unlikely that multi-modal event models that are used to make integrated predictions actually 
exist. 
 Therefore, a third possibility is that event models consist of separate representations from 
each sensory modality. Specifically, each of the sensory and motor systems may represent the 
state of the environment separately. Then, when a task requires the use of multiple sensory 
modalities, the necessary brain regions for each separate system may be activated in concert, 
which would result in the likely incorrect perception that active integration has occurred. For 
example, for the PLAT, visual areas and motor areas are likely both activated, and separate 
prediction processes within the respective areas operating in parallel could create an illusion of 
integration. A spike in prediction errors in one modality would lead to an updating of the 
representation of that modality, and people would experience this updating as an event boundary. 
If prediction errors spiked in multiple modalities at the same time (due to rapid changes in both 
visual and auditory information, for example) people might experience an even stronger 
perception of an event boundary.  
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The existence of separate representations rather than a unified event model is consistent with 
previous research evidence that prediction is more difficult around event boundaries (Zacks, 
Kurby, Eisenberg, & Haroutunian, 2011): prediction in the modality or modalities relevant to the 
rapid changes in the environment would be more difficult around event boundaries, though 
prediction in other modalities would not be affected. The existence of separate event models is 
also compatible with evidence that memory is updated at event boundaries (Swallow et al., 
2011), as memory for visual information, for example, might be updated around event 
boundaries that are driven by visual changes in the environment, whereas memory for auditory 
information might not be updated in response to visual changes. This account is also in accord 
with previous research demonstrating that, at least during reading, components of event models 
can be updated independently. For example, Curiel & Radvansky (2014) found that spatial shifts 
and character shifts both slowed down reading time but the effects did not interact, suggesting 
that they did not influence one another. Though the results of this study were interpreted to be 
consistent with a unified event model that is updated incrementally rather than globally, the 
results of this study can also be interpreted as evidence against a unified event model, where 
representations of each type of shift are independent of one another and are used separately to 
make predictions. However, this account is less consistent with recent research on working 
memory updating. For example, Bailey & Zacks (2015) had participants read narratives that 
included shifts in characters and locations and answer recognition memory probes interspersed 
throughout the text. When these probes came after a shift in either character or location, people 
were slower to answer questions about either dimension, suggesting that participants primarily 
engaged in global event model updating. In addition, Radvansky, Tamplin, & Krawietz (2010) 
found that word pairs that were unrelated to the visual environment were less well remembered 
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after a visual and motor event boundary of walking through a doorway, which provides 
additional evidence for an integrated event model and against separate representations of 
information in each modality.  
 This leaves open the fourth possibility that unified event models exist and that people vary 
in their ability to use event models to make predictions, but individual differences in prediction 
are driven by modality-specific prediction mechanisms that operate upstream of a multi-modal 
event model. In this case, each brain system would make predictions independently of one 
another, and spikes in prediction error in any one modality could cause the unified event model 
to update its representation of the current situation. This would mean that predictions might not 
be correlated across task modality if prediction ability within each brain system differs within 
individuals. For example, if a person makes very accurate predictions when tasks require 
predictions based on visual information but experiences difficulty making predictions using 
auditory information, that person would display quite different performance on prediction tasks 
requiring each of the modalities. The lack of correlations among the four tasks used in the 
current study is consistent with this possibility.  
 If it is indeed the case that individual differences are driven by modality-specific prediction 
mechanisms and that a multi-modal event model is updated incrementally whenever there is a 
spike in prediction error within any modality, some changes must be made to the EST model. 
Specifically, instead of sensory information entering a single perceptual processing node, 
sensory information from each modality would enter a perceptual processing node specific to the 
modality. Each perceptual processing node would receive information from a unified event 
model and would use this information to make predictions. Separate error processing 
mechanisms would monitor these predictions and when errors are signaled from any of these 
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error processing mechanisms, people would experience a subjective event boundary and the 
unified event model would update to capture the changes in the environment. The process would 
then repeat until the next error signal causes the event model to update again. For example, if 
visual information were changing rapidly, predictions about future visual information would 
likely be incorrect. This would cause the event model to update to better represent the new state 
of the visual information. Once the new information is integrated into the event model, relevant 
information from the event model would be used by all of the brain systems to continue making 
predictions. If there were changes in multiple modalities at the same time, people would still 
experience a single event boundary, but the event model would be updated to capture the 
changed information from all of the relevant modalities. Figure 16 provides a potential 
representation of such a model of event comprehension and prediction. 
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 4.5. Limitations of the Current Study 
 There are some limitations of the current study that are important in interpreting the results. 
First, the reliability of most of the tasks included in the current study was relatively high, except 
for the split-half reliability of the visual world task (r = 0.53), the Letter Sets task (r = 0.44) and 
the Paper Folding task (r = 0.67). There is therefore some chance that the low reliability of these 
tasks prevented them from correlating with the other tasks included in the current study. 
Figure 16. Suggested model of Event Segmentation Theory if individual differences are driven 
by modality-specific prediction mechanisms. In this case, error signals from any of the 
modalities would lead to the perception of a subjective event boundary and would reset a unified 
event model. Information from the unified event model would then be used by separate 
perceptual processing systems specific to each modality to make new predictions. Only the 
visual and auditory systems are represented here for the sake of simplicity, but there are likely 
many more separate systems that are involved in making predictions. 
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However, other methods of scoring the visual world task resulted in even lower split-half 
reliability scores. Specifically, when growth curves for looking time were calculated separately 
for predictive and unpredictive trials, and the slopes from the unpredictive trials were subtracted 
from the slopes for the predictive trials to obtain a difference score, the split half reliability was 
0.16. Similarly, when the cumulative looking time on unpredictive trials was subtracted from the 
cumulative looking time on predictive trials to obtain a difference score, the split-half reliability 
was 0.18. One potential explanation for the low split-half reliability is the relatively small 
number of trials participants completed during this task; participants only completed 24 
experimental trials in this task, half of which were unpredictive sentences and half of which were 
predictive sentences. This means that for the split-half reliability testing, each half of the data 
only included six trials of each type. Therefore, the split-half reliability found in this study may 
not replicate in other studies, and a study with a larger number of trials would be necessary to 
determine the actual reliability of this task. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that higher reliability of 
the visual world task would have dramatically changed the results of the current study. None of 
the other prediction tasks were correlated with one another, and the correlations between 
performance on the visual world task and the other prediction tasks were so low that even if a 
portion of the signal from the visual world task were correlated with performance on the other 
tasks, it still is unlikely that the noise masked more than a small correlation among the tasks.  
Similarly, the low split-half reliability for the Letter Sets and Paper Folding tasks was likely due, 
in part, to the small number of trials in each task. A study using larger numbers of items for each 
of these tasks would be necessary to determine whether the low split-half reliability is an 
intrinsic feature of these tasks. However, it is unlikely that the low split-half reliabilities of the 
Letter Sets task and the Paper Folding task dramatically affected the results of the current study. 
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All three of the fluid intelligence tasks loaded strongly on a fluid intelligence latent factor, 
meaning that the fluid intelligence latent factor likely captured the signal present in all of the 
tasks without being significantly affected by the noise in the tasks.  
 In addition, although I examined the relationships between PTSD severity and performance 
on the prediction tasks in the study, there were few participants with high scores on the PTSD 
scale. This lack of variability may have obscured the true relationships between PTSD severity 
and prediction performance. As mentioned above, Eisenberg, Zacks, and Flores (in prep) 
examined performance on the PLAT in a clinical sample of people diagnosed with PTSD and 
found that people with PTSD performed more poorly on the task than control participants 
without PTSD. However, no relationship between PTSD severity and performance on the PLAT 
was found in the current study. Similarly, previous studies have found relationships between 
PTSD and performance on tasks of general cognitive functioning (e.g., Vasterling et al., 2002; 
Bremner, Vermetten, Afzal, & Vythilingam, 2004), whereas there were no significant 
relationships between PTSD severity and crystallized or fluid intelligence in the current study; 
however, the previous studies included more participants with clinical levels of PTSD. 
Therefore, additional research examining the relationship between PTSD severity and 
performance on various types of prediction tasks is necessary to determine whether PTSD 
impacts performance on prediction tasks other than the PLAT.   
 Furthermore, as discussed earlier, it is possible that the low correlations among the 
prediction tasks could have been due to differences in methods across the tasks, as the tasks all 
required different abilities in addition to prediction. One potential method for controlling for 
potential individual difference in abilities other than prediction would be to test participants’ 
performance on tasks that require each of the non-prediction abilities and then control for these 
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individual differences in the final analyses. For example, participants could complete tasks that 
are relatively pure measures of spatial ability, risk processing, language processing, and motor 
planning, and scores on these measures could then be entered as covariates in analyses of the 
correlations among the prediction tasks.  
In addition to potentially requiring different abilities, the tasks also differed in the directions 
given to participants for each task. For example, for both the weather prediction and the Iowa 
gambling tasks, the directions to participants were very explicit and explained the true nature of 
the task: Participants were told to make predictions about whether there would be rain or sun in 
the weather prediction task, and participants were told to choose decks in a way that made them 
the most money in the Iowa gambling task. On the other hand, for both the PLAT and the visual 
world task, the directions did not explain the ultimate goal for the task: For the PLAT, 
participants were simply told to pay attention to the movie, and for the visual world task, 
participants were told to respond based on whether the sentence that they heard applied to any of 
the images on the screen, without any reference to the predictive nature of the task. It is possible 
that if participants had been told to actively make predictions during all of the tasks, that 
performance across the tasks would have been more similar. On the other hand, it is highly likely 
that people make predictions during everyday life without realizing that they are doing so, and it 
is therefore likely that people made predictions while they performed the visual world task and 
the PLAT as well.  In addition, the pairs of tasks that used similar directions were not correlated 
with one another, again suggesting that differences in directions across the tasks cannot explain 
the low correlations among the tasks.  
Another source of difference across the tasks is how performance was measured for the four 
tasks. Performance on the weather prediction and Iowa gambling tasks was measured using the 
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accuracy of responses, whereas performance on the PLAT and the weather prediction task was 
measured using oculometric data. Accuracy data only provides a measure of the final decision a 
participant makes about a particular item, whereas eye tracking data can be much more sensitive, 
providing information throughout the decision making process. It is possible that if eye tracking 
data had been collected while participants performed the weather prediction and Iowa gambling 
tasks, the increased sensitivity would have allowed correlations among the tasks to emerge.  
In addition, especially for the Iowa gambling task, an accuracy measure may not have been 
the best choice for examining individual differences on this task. While individual variation 
certainly existed within the data set, many previous studies using this task used measures of skin 
conductance to determine how well participants had learned the task and when they began 
making predictions based on their knowledge. For example, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & 
Damasio (1997) identified a hunch period, in which participants were unable to report that they 
knew some decks were bad, but experienced an increased skin conductance response when 
choosing from the bad decks. Predictions during this hunch period might more closely resemble 
the predictions made in the PLAT and visual world task. Although skin conductance responses 
have not typically been used in the weather prediction task, a similar effect might exist in which 
participants experience an increased skin conductance response when making an incorrect 
choice, while still experiencing the feeling of guessing on the trial. If eye tracking were 
combined with skin conductance measures, it might be possible to use the time spent looking at 
the correct choice during the hunch phase as a measure of prediction performance on the task, 
and that measure might correlate more strongly with performance on the PLAT and the visual 
world task. However, if the measurement modality were the driver of the lack of correlations 
among the four tasks, one would expect that the tasks with more similar measurement modalities 
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would be most highly correlated with one another, which was not the case; all of the tasks had 
very low correlations with one another, and most of the correlations among the pairs of tasks 
with the same measurement modalities were actually slightly lower than the correlations among 
pairs of tasks with different measurement modalities. Therefore, measurement modality is 
unlikely to have been the only reason performance on these tasks was uncorrelated. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
In this study, performance on four different types of prediction tasks was uncorrelated, 
providing evidence against a single higher-order prediction mechanism. While the results of this 
study suggest that existing theories about prediction require some alteration, particularly the 
predictive coding theory (Friston, 2005) and Event Segmentation Theory (Zacks et al., 2007), the 
results are not directly in opposition with these theories. The predictive coding theory does not 
necessitate a unified prediction mechanism, though such a mechanism was proposed due to the 
similar anatomical structure of many systems in the brain (Adams, Friston, & Bastosm 2015). In 
fact, the results of this study are in accord with the hierarchical predictive brain proposed by 
Friston (2005), with systems that process information from each modality sending predictive 
signals from higher order areas to lower order areas and vice versa. In addition, the results of this 
study certainly do not provide evidence against the whole of Event Segmentation Theory, but 
rather suggest that certain elements of the theory need revision.  Overall, instead of an 
integratory prediction mechanism, it appears most likely that predictions are formed and acted 
upon separately within each sensory modality and that the resulting behavior creates an illusion 
of integration. This may be represented in the brain by the activation of separate but overlapping 
brain regions that, when activated at the same time by different components of a task, creates the 
appearance of an integratory prediction mechanism. Finally, these results can also inform future 
studies on prediction, including those investigating prediction ability in psychopathology: 
Attempting to generalize from performance on one type of prediction task to another will likely 
result in only erroneous predictions.    
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